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Foreword by the Secretary of State. 
Successive governments have ignored the need for fundamental welfare reform,  
not because they didn’t think that reform was needed but because they thought  
it too difficult to achieve.
Instead of grasping the nettle, they watched as economic growth bypassed the  
worst off and welfare dependency took root in communities up and down the  
country, breeding hopelessness and intergenerational poverty.
The scale of that failure can be measured in terms of a working-age welfare budget  
that has increased by 45 per cent in real terms over the last decade while poverty for 
working-age adults has increased and social mobility has reduced; the Government  
has spent vast sums of money but the poor have become relatively poorer and the 
rungs on the ladder to prosperity have moved further apart. 
The welfare bill has become unsustainably expensive, but the real price of this failure 
has been paid by the poorest and the most vulnerable themselves. Today, five million 
people are on out-of-work benefits in the UK, and 1.4 million of them have been 
receiving out-of-work benefits for nine out of the last ten years. Not only that, but we  
now have one of the highest rates of workless households in Europe, with 1.9 million 
children living in homes where no-one has a job.
A life on benefits is a poor substitute for a working life but too much of our current 
system is geared toward maintaining people on benefits rather than helping them 
to flourish in work; we need reform that tackles the underlying problem of welfare 
dependency. That is why we are embarking on the most far-reaching programme  
of change that the welfare system has witnessed in generations.
Universal Credit: welfare that works marks the beginning of a new contract between 
people who have and people who have not. At its heart, Universal Credit is very simple 
and will ensure that work always pays and is seen to pay. 
Universal Credit will mean that people will be consistently and transparently better  
off for each hour they work and every pound they earn. It will cut through the 
complexity of the existing benefit system to make it easier for people to get the help 
they need, when they need it. By utilising tried and proven information technology, we 
will streamline the system to reduce administration costs and minimise opportunities  
for error or fraud.
Our reforms put work, whether full time, part time or just a few hours per week,  
at the centre of our welfare system. As such it extends a ladder of opportunity to  
those who have previously been excluded or marginalised from the world of work. 
The Rt Hon 
Iain Duncan Smith MP  
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 
2 Executive summary 
1. The Coalition Government is determined to reform the benefit system to make  
it fairer, more affordable and better able to tackle poverty, worklessness and 
welfare dependency. We have already announced a range of measures in the 
Budget and the Spending Review to achieve this. Alongside these measures we 
made the commitment to overhaul the benefit system to promote work and 
personal responsibility. 
2. This White Paper sets out the Coalition Government’s plans to introduce legislation 
to reform the welfare system by creating a new Universal Credit. This Universal 
Credit will radically simplify the system to make work pay and combat worklessness 
and poverty. This publication outlines the need for change, how Universal Credit will 
work, how it will affect benefit recipients and its broader impact. 
3. Our consultation document, 21st Century Welfare (Cm 7913, July 2010), spelt out 
the problems of poor work incentives and complexity in the current benefits and 
Tax Credits systems. We invited contributions from the public and we received over 
1,600 responses via post, email and through our online consultation site. There was 
general agreement on the need for reform with strong support for our objectives  
of streamlining the system and making work pay. The majority of respondents  
who commented on the specific options for reform recognised the attractions  
of moving towards a single benefit. A brief report on the responses is contained  
in Annex 1. A fuller report, Consultation responses to 21st Century Welfare 
(Cm 7971, November 2010), appears today alongside this publication.
  “We broadly welcome the direction of welfare reform proposed by the Coalition 
Government and we support the intention to make the benefit system simpler  
and clearer for recipients, and to make work pay.” Citizens Advice 
Executive summary. 
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  “...there are substantial advantages to having a more integrated benefits and Tax 
Credits system: it would reduce the Government’s administration costs and the 
amount of money lost to fraud and error, and be simpler for recipients to understand, 
which might in itself encourage some to enter work. We agree with this assessment, 
and consider there to be a strong case for integrating all benefits and Tax Credits into 
a single benefit.” The Institute for Fiscal Studies 
4. For people reliant on benefits the returns from work can be extremely low.  
In the current system, many have all or almost all of their earnings deducted  
from their benefits. This lack of any significant return from work is compounded 
by the complexity of separate out-of-work benefits and in-work Tax Credits and 
Housing Benefit, creating a disconnect between out-of-work benefits and in-work 
support. Taking a low-paid job means people running a large risk as Tax Credits  
are calculated and Housing Benefit adjusted over weeks and sometimes months. 
We know that many are simply not prepared to take that risk and remain trapped 
on benefits for many years as a result.
5. This has consequences for us all, not just those trapped on benefits who no longer 
see work as the best route out of poverty. The social and economic costs of the 
current system’s failures are borne by society as a whole, since worklessness 
blights the life chances of parents and children and diminishes the country’s 
productive potential. The UK has one of the highest rates of children growing  
up in homes where no one works and this pattern repeats itself through the 
generations. Less than 60 per cent of lone parents in the UK are in employment, 
compared to 70 per cent or more in France, Germany and the Netherlands.
6. Universal Credit will start to change this. It will reintroduce the culture of work  
in households where it may have been absent for generations.  
7. Universal Credit is an integrated working-age credit that will provide a basic 
allowance with additional elements for children, disability, housing and caring.  
It will support people both in and out of work, replacing Working Tax Credit,  
Child Tax Credit, Housing Benefit, Income Support, income-based Jobseeker’s 
Allowance and income-related Employment and Support Allowance.
8. The Government is committed to ensuring that no-one loses as a direct result of 
these reforms. We have ensured that no-one will experience a reduction in the 
benefit they receive as a result of the introduction of Universal Credit. 
9. Universal Credit will improve financial work incentives by ensuring that support  
is reduced at a consistent and managed rate as people return to work and  
increase their working hours and earnings. People will generally keep more  
of their earnings for themselves and their families than is currently the case. 
10. Universal Credit will also remove the distortions in the current system that tend  
to over-reward people for working a specific number of hours that may not suit 
them or their employers. Universal Credit will ensure that all amounts of work  
will be more financially rewarding than inactivity and remove the current barriers 
to small amounts of work. 
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11. Universal Credit will merge out-of-work benefits and in-work support. This means 
that people will no longer have to take a risk in moving from one system to 
another. For those in employment, Universal Credit will be calculated and delivered 
electronically, automatically adjusting credit payments according to monthly 
income reported through an upgraded version of the Pay As You Earn tax system 
(on which HM Revenue & Customs will be consulting shortly). The system will be 
simpler and will respond more quickly to changes in earnings so that people will 
not face the same complexities as they do now, particularly at the end of a tax 
year. As a result people will be much clearer about their entitlements and the 
beneficial effects of increasing their earnings by taking on more hours or doing 
some overtime.
12. This would involve an IT development of moderate scale, which the Department  
for Work and Pensions and its suppliers are confident of handling within budget 
and timescale. 
13. The clear financial incentive provided by Universal Credit will be backed up by a 
strong system of conditionality; unemployed people who can work will be required 
to take all reasonable steps to find and move into employment. Conditionality  
will be responsive to an individual’s circumstances – reflecting, for example, that 
whilst the majority should move into full-time work, for some people there may  
be temporary periods when part-time work is appropriate (for example, for some 
lone parents). 
14. Strengthened conditionality will in turn be supported by a new system of  
financial sanctions. The new sanctions will provide greater incentives for  
people to meet their responsibilities.
15. Overall administration of the new benefit will be managed by one department – 
the Department for Work and Pensions – as opposed to today’s complex delivery 
of current benefits through the Department for Work and Pensions, HM Revenue 
& Customs and Local Authorities. People will have one system to contact rather 
than having to repeat information to three separate bodies, so strengthening the 
connection between financial and labour market support. 
16. As a simpler, streamlined system, Universal Credit will reduce the scope for costly 
errors on the part of recipients and administrators. By allowing recipients to benefit 
financially from doing small amounts of irregular work Universal Credit will reduce 
the incentive for people to commit fraud by failing to declare work. A simpler, more 
automated system linked to taxes and earnings will also make it easier to detect 
and prosecute serious organised fraud.
17. Over the Spending Review period £2 billion has been set aside as part of the 
Department for Work and Pensions settlement to fund the implementation  
of the Universal Credit. 
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18. In the long run we expect the impact of Universal Credit on society to be 
considerable. We expect as many as 350,000 children and 500,000 working age 
adults could be moved out of poverty by these changes, by virtue of the changes  
to entitlement and increased take-up of benefit.  
19. Over and above this we know that work, and the improved incomes that flow 
from it, have beneficial effects in terms of people’s health and well-being, the 
educational achievements of children and improvements in communities, such 
as reduced crime and anti-social behaviour. It is difficult to quantify these effects 
precisely but their existence is not in doubt. 
20. The Government intends to introduce a Welfare Reform Bill in January 2011 to give 
effect to these changes. We will then adopt a phased approach to the introduction 
of Universal Credit with the first individuals expected to enter the new system from 
2013, followed by the gradual closure of existing benefits and Tax Credits claims 
and their transfer to the new system. 
21. Universal Credit represents a fundamental change for Britain’s welfare system. 
It will create a leaner but fairer system administered by a single government 
department delivering support that is integrated and explicitly focused on  
ensuring that work always pays. It will substantially reduce poverty and, as well  
as being fairer, the system will also be firmer. The links between benefit payments, 
earnings and tax will in turn make the system more secure from fraud and error 
and conditionality will push people to do as much work as is reasonable for them. 
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1Why do we need fundamental  reform?  
1. The Government is committed to reforming the welfare system to make it fairer, 
more affordable and to tackle poverty and welfare dependency, whilst continuing 
to support the most vulnerable in society. As a first step, the Government 
announced a number of measures in the Budget and Spending Review 2010. 
2. The changes include:
•  capping household benefit payments so that families do not receive more  
in welfare than median after-tax earnings for working households;
•  withdrawing Child Benefit from families with a higher rate taxpayer;
•  measures to control the cost of Tax Credits, Housing Benefit and Council  
Tax Benefit; and
•  time-limiting contributory Employment and Support Allowance for those in  
the Work Related Activity Group.
3. In the Spending Review the Government made it clear that these and other 
measures were intended to create a fair and affordable platform on which to 
introduce a new and radically different system of support for people of working 
age – Universal Credit. 
4. The background to this announcement is the commitment in the Coalition 
Agreement to investigate how to simplify the benefits system in order to  
improve incentives to work. This was reinforced in the Queen’s Speech in May, 
where we announced that both the tax and benefits systems would be made  
fairer and simpler. In July of this year the Government published 21st Century 
Welfare (Cm 7913), a consultation paper that laid out the problems of poor work 
incentives and complexity in the benefits and Tax Credits system and proposed  
a number of measures to tackle these. 
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The current system
5. Whilst the current system provides targeted support to meet specific needs,  
the net effect is an array of benefits, each with its own rules and criteria,  
interacting in complicated ways, creating perverse incentives and penalties, 
confusion, and administrative cost. 
6. There are more than 30 benefits and many more potential combinations of 
benefits and additional premiums. Some simplifications have been made but  
much more can and must be done. 
7. The current system provides a range of separate, and often overlapping, payments 
to meet a wide range of needs: 
a.  Income Support, Jobseeker’s Allowance and Employment and Support 
Allowance provide basic income replacement, delivered through Jobcentre Plus; 
b.  Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit support rent and council tax, 
delivered by Local Authorities; 
c.  a range of payments meet the additional needs of disabled people and carers. 
Some of these (like Employment Support Allowance and disability premiums 
within Income Support) are paid via Jobcentre Plus; Disability Living Allowance 
and Carer’s Allowance are delivered by the Pension, Disability and Carers Service; 
d.  Child Benefit supports parents with children, supplemented by Child Tax Credit 
for low-income families, paid by HM Revenue & Customs; and  
e.  Working Tax Credit supports certain low-paid workers and makes provision for 
childcare, also paid by HM Revenue & Customs. 
8. Some of these are individually based (such as contributory Jobseeker’s Allowance 
and Employment and Support Allowance), others are ‘household’ payments, 
assessed on the basis of the income and savings of both members of a couple.   
Poor work incentives 
9. A key motivating factor for people going to work, doing extra hours and taking 
extra responsibility, is to earn money so that they can look after themselves and 
their family. 
10. Income-related benefits are provided to people who cannot earn enough to meet 
their essential needs, such as food, housing and utilities. If people on benefits do 
earn some money it is only right that their income-related benefits are reduced  
so that they spend their own earnings rather than taxpayers’. 
8 Chapter 1 Why do we need fundamental reform?
11. However, the current rules start to reduce benefit after a very small amount of 
earnings at the rate of a pound of benefit for every pound earned. This means  
that many who currently rely on benefits for all their basic needs would have to  
work for many hours at the minimum wage before they were noticably better off.  
This provides little rational incentive to work legitimately for a few hours because 
every penny earned over a small ‘disregard’ is lost through reduced benefits.  
This tends to push work underground and undermines activity that we want  
to encourage. 1 
12. Financial work incentives have been grafted onto the existing system, but distinct 
in-work benefits have failed to convince many people to make the transition 
to work. Working Tax Credit provides a substantial boost to income for people 
increasing their hours of work. However, this boost only occurs when hours  
worked are above 16, 24 or 30 hours, depending on family type. 
13. Once in receipt of Working Tax Credit, greater effort also often receives little or 
no financial reward as Tax Credits, Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit are 
withdrawn at the same time as liability for Income Tax and National Insurance 
contributions increase.
14. The combined effect of benefit withdrawal rates and additional tax as earnings 
increase is called the Marginal Deduction Rate and has the same practical effect as 
a tax rate. Currently, when combined with tax and National Insurance payments, 
the withdrawal of Tax Credits, Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit can lead 
to Marginal Deduction Rates which are nearly 96 per cent, much higher than the 
highest rate of Income Tax. 
15. The current system incentivises many people to work no more or less than the 
minimum hours required to qualify for Working Tax Credit. This fails to reflect  
the flexible working pattern that modern employers and individuals need. 
16. Furthermore, the simultaneous withdrawal of different benefits at different taper 
rates creates uncertainty as it produces variable, unpredictable and often very high 
Marginal Deduction Rates, depending on how much the individual earns. Figure 1 
shows typical Marginal Deduction Rates under the current system faced by a lone 
parent with two children.
1 Barbour A, 2008, Work Incentives in the Benefit System: Increasing Levels of Earnings Disregards, Community Links 
Evidence Paper No. 12; SPARK Research, 2004, A Review of the DWP Benefit Fraud Sanctions Regime, Department for 
Work and Pensions In-house report.
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Complexity as a barrier to work 
17. Research shows that complexity means that it is difficult for people to know what 
benefits and Tax Credits they can get. This undermines trust in the system and 
stops people focusing on getting back to work. 2 
18. Nearly half of the six million working-age people getting benefits from the 
Department for Work and Pensions also get Housing Benefit from their Local 
Authority and around 1.6 million people receive both a Department for Work and 
Pensions benefit and some Tax Credits from HM Revenue & Customs. About a third 
of Housing Benefit recipients also receive Tax Credits and have to deal with both 
HM Revenue & Customs and their Local Authority. This includes virtually all families 
with children on Housing Benefit. In about 450,000 cases the Local Authority has 
to establish the amount of Tax Credits in payment so that this can be taken into 
account as income. This accounts for about a third of the cases where the Local 
Authority itself has to carry out its own means test rather than relying on one 
already carried out by the Department for Work and Pensions. 
2 Community Links, Low Incomes Tax Reform Group, 2007, Interact: benefits, Tax Credits and moving into work, CPAG; 
Royston S, 2007, Benefit simplification and the recipient, Department for Work and Pensions; Sainsbury R and Weston K, 
2010, Exploratory qualitative research on the ‘Single Working Age Benefit’ Department for Work and Pensions Research 
Report No. 659.
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19. The transition between out-of-work benefits and work can involve uncertainty in 
leaving the familiar security of the benefits system for the uncertainty of work, 
which is then further compounded by uncertainty over what support is available in 
work and whether it will be processed in time to replace out-of-work entitlements. 
This can cause severe financial hardship and emotional stress. For the poorest 
families there simply isn’t any overdraft facility or spare money to cover delays  
or mistakes.
20. The net result of how different benefits and incentives stop and start puts pressure 
on people on low incomes to work no more or less than the number of hours at 
which they become eligible for Tax Credits. This does not reflect the needs of a 
flexible labour market or what should be the rational relationship between hours 
worked and financial reward received. 
The administrative cost of complexity
21. The complexity of the system also generates inefficiency. In 2009, 2.3 million 
contacts to the Department for Work and Pensions were driven by people 
contacting the wrong agency and 1.4 million by people contacting the wrong 
office. 3 This complexity prevents people taking up benefits to which they are 
entitled. For example, in 2008/09 only between 38 and 51 per cent of those in  
work and entitled to Housing Benefit actually claimed. 4
22. People are currently required to communicate changes in their personal and 
financial circumstance separately to different organisations (for example, 
Jobcentre Plus, HM Revenue & Customs, the Pension, Disability and Carers  
Service or the Local Authority), so that adjustments can be made to benefit 
entitlement. The same information is often provided several times over. This 
increases the number of unnecessary contacts, at a cost to both the individual  
and the taxpayer, with each contact increasing the potential for fraud and error. 
23. We estimate that £5.2 billion a year is wrongly paid out as a result of fraud and 
error: £2.1 billion of fraud and error in Tax Credits 5 and £3.1 billion in Department 
for Work and Pensions benefits. 6 Underpayments are also a problem, leaving 
people without legitimate entitlements estimated at £1.3 billion a year in benefits 
and £260 million a year in Tax Credits. 7 The Government has set out a strategy 8 
to reduce significantly the level of fraud and error in the welfare system. 
Simplification of the system will help us to go even further in removing the 
structural propensity towards error. 
3 Department for Work and Pensions management information gathered in 2009.
4 Department for Work and Pensions, 2010, income-related benefits: estimates of take-up 2008-09.
5 HM Revenue & Customs, 2009, Child and Working Tax Credits Fraud and Error Statistics 2008-09.
6 Department for Work and Pensions, 2010, Fraud and Error in the Benefit System: October 2008 to September 2009.
7 Ibid; HM Revenue and Customs, 2009, Child and Working Tax Credits Fraud and Error Statistics 2008-09.
8 HM Revenue & Customs and Department for Work and Pensions, October 2010. Tackling Fraud and Error in the 
benefit and tax credit systems.
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24. The Government spends a further £3.5 billion each year on administration. 9 
The Department for Work and Pensions and its agencies spend around £2 billion 
a year, Local Authorities spend a further £1 billion to administer Housing Benefit 
and Council Tax Benefit, while HM Revenue & Customs spends £450 million 
administering Tax Credits. Multiple agencies use valuable resources to gather  
and manage essentially the same information. 
The rising cost of welfare dependency and poverty
25. Welfare dependency is a significant and growing problem in Britain, with huge 
social and economic cost for individuals, their families and wider society. The 
welfare state has become a vast, sprawling bureaucracy that maintains, rather 
than really challenges, poverty:
a.  more than one in four working-age adults in the UK does not work, and at 
least 2.6 million people spent at least half of the last ten years on some form  
of out-of-work benefit; 10 
b.  around a fifth of families with children are in poverty at any one time and 
around two-fifths experienced poverty at some time in a four year period; 11 and
c.  35 per cent of families remain in poverty when a parent enters work 12 yet 
2.4 million households now receive Working Tax Credit. 13 
26. To be effective and sustainable, public investment in tackling poverty must be 
about more than transferring money from those who have to those who have  
not. In the last decade, expenditure on working-age benefits and Tax Credits has 
risen from £52 billion in 1996/97 to £74 billion in 2009/10 14. Spending on working-
age Housing Benefit has increased by more than 25 per cent to £14.2 billion.
27. We cannot continue with spending on welfare that all too often has a negative, 
rather than a positive, impact. Its complexity and poor financial incentives to  
work are key factors in trapping people on out-of-work benefits. The long-term 
effect on our society is particularly worrying given that a higher proportion of  
children grow up in a workless household in the UK than in almost any other EU 
country 15 and children growing up in disadvantaged families are more likely to 
be disadvantaged themselves. 16 
9 Department for Work and Pensions, HM Revenue & Customs and Local Authority expenditure data.
10 Cabinet Office, May 2010, State of the nation report: poverty, worklessness and welfare dependency in the UK.
11 Browne J and Paull G, 2010, Parent’s work entry, progression and retention and child poverty, Department for Work 
and Pensions Research Report No. 626.
12 Ibid.
13 HM Revenue & Customs, April 2010, Child and Working Tax Credits Statistics, Office of National Statistics.
14  Department for Work and Pensions and HM Revenue & Customs expenditure data.
15 Eurostat, 2008 data.
16 Cabinet Office, 2009, Understanding the risks of social exclusion across the life course: Families with Children. 
Social Exclusion Task Force. 
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Conclusion
28. The benefits system was conceived mainly to protect people from poverty,  
but for many it has had the opposite effect of trapping individuals, families  
and whole communities in the very condition it was supposed to alleviate.  
The waste of human potential is immense and the cost to our country vastly 
exceeds the monetary benefits paid.
29. The Government wants to create a welfare system that provides people with the 
confidence and security to play a full part in society through a flexible labour 
market within a competitive modern economy. Progress has been made over the 
past 20 years. Britain is internationally recognised as having some of the most 
effective labour market policies in the world, helping people, including those 
previously written off as ‘inactive’ in the labour market, to move off benefits and 
into work through conditionality and support. We need to bring the parts of the  
system that are not working up to the level of the best.
30. The measures announced in the Budget and Spending Review will start the  
process of making the system fair and affordable. But more radical reform to 
improve work incentives and make the system genuinely simpler is essential  
to tackling the key underlying problems.
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2Universal Credit:   a new approach  to welfare  
Universal Credit is a radical new approach to welfare:
•  It will bring together different forms of income-related support and provide  
a simple, integrated, benefit for people in or out of work. 
•  It will consist of a basic personal amount (similar to the current Jobseeker’s 
Allowance) with additional amounts for disability, caring responsibilities,  
housing costs and children.
•  As earnings rise, we expect Universal Credit will be withdrawn at a constant  
rate of around 65 pence for each pound of net earnings. Higher earnings  
disregards will also reinforce work incentives for selected groups. 
When introduced, Universal Credit will initially apply to new claims. It will be  
phased in for existing benefit and Tax Credit recipients. There will be no cash  
losers at the point of change, ensuring that no one will see their benefits  
reduced when Universal Credit is introduced.
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1. The Government is determined to introduce radical change to tackle the problems 
in the current welfare system. 21st Century Welfare (Cm 7913) outlined several 
possible models of reform. The Government has concluded that the Universal 
Credit is the right approach to deliver the fundamental changes needed. 
2. Universal Credit offers the greatest scope to improve work incentives. It is likely to 
be the most effective of the models in smoothing the transition to work, especially 
given the opportunity for greater automation. The majority of respondents to the 
consultation who expressed a preference said they preferred the Universal Credit 
to other options.  
Key features of Universal Credit
3. Universal Credit will be an integrated benefit in place of Income Support, income-
based Jobseeker’s Allowance, income-related Employment and Support Allowance, 
Housing Benefit, Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit. 
4. The amount of Universal Credit will depend on the level of income and other  
family circumstances. It will be payable in and out of work so the complicated  
rules that apply currently when people start and leave a job, including hours  
rules, will disappear, improving the incentive to work. 
5. The Universal Credit will have a simple structure designed to:
• provide a basic income for people out of work, covering a range of needs;
• make work pay as people move into and progress in work; and
• help lift people out of poverty.
6. Within Universal Credit, the key mechanisms for making work pay will be  
a single taper to withdraw support as earnings rise and a new approach to 
earnings disregards. 
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A single taper 
7. The taper is the rate at which benefit is reduced to take account of earnings. 
8. Currently, there are different tapers for benefits and Tax Credits and tapers can 
apply to either gross or net income. Housing Benefit has a 65 per cent taper on net 
income. Council Tax Benefit has a 20 per cent taper on net income. The Tax Credits 
taper of 41 per cent (from April 2011) on gross income is equivalent to a net income 
taper of about 60 per cent. The interaction of all these tapers can lead to Marginal 
Deduction Rates of almost 100 per cent. 
9. The Government is determined to ensure that work pays. We believe that a 
withdrawal rate of around 65 per cent would deliver sufficient work incentives 
whilst also being affordable. This taper would apply to earnings net of tax and 
National Insurance meaning that the highest Marginal Deduction Rate for  
low-earning workers would be reduced from around 96 per cent to 65 per cent  
for those earning below the personal tax threshold and to around 76 per cent  
for basic rate taxpayers. 
Disregards 
10. We want to ensure that people are encouraged to take jobs of only a few hours  
a week if this is all that is possible for them in the short term. To achieve this we 
will allow some groups to earn significantly more before their benefit starts to be 
withdrawn. The level of these earnings disregards will reflect the needs of different 
families to ensure that work pays. 
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11. For example, a couple with children will get a higher disregard than a similar  
couple without children. There will also be a higher disregard for disabled people. 
These disregards will be reduced to reflect the amount of support being provided 
for rent or mortgage interest support. For details of the expected structure and 
amount of disregards see Annex 3. 
Impact on benefits in payment
12. In most cases Universal Credit will provide a similar or higher level of support than 
the current system. In particular, benefit rates for people not in work will generally 
be the same as under the current system.
13. The Government is committed to ensuring that no-one loses as a direct result of 
these reforms. If the amount of Universal Credit a person is entitled to is less than 
the amount they were getting under the old system, an additional amount will be 
paid to ensure that they will be no worse off in cash terms. 
Impact on incentives 
14. The two charts below illustrate how both individuals and couples with children can 
be better off when working with Universal Credit than currently, as a result of the 
earnings disregards and single taper. 
Universal Credit: welfare that works 17
15. The charts show how under the current system support jumps at particular points. 
This is because of the hours rules in Working Tax Credit. Under Universal Credit,  
net income increases steadily with each hour worked. This means that people  
are always better off in work than not working and provides certainty that 
increased effort will always result in increased reward.
Take-up 
16. The Universal Credit should also improve take-up: a powerful tool in tackling 
poverty. There are two main reasons. First, Universal Credit will be much simpler 
than the current array of different benefits, so it should be easier for people to 
understand whether they have and entitlement. Second, as it is an integrated 
payment, there will no longer be any need to claim separately for different benefits. 
17. However, the cost of this additional take-up cannot simply be inferred by looking 
at current published statistics on non-take-up. Any estimate needs to account 
for both the changing pattern of entitlements under the Universal Credit and the 
fact that many people who currently do not engage with the welfare system will 
continue to resist doing so. 
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Structure of Universal Credit 
18. Universal Credit will consist of a basic personal amount with additional amounts 
where appropriate. These additions will be for: disability, caring responsibilities, 
housing costs, and children. We are also considering how best to support parents 
with childcare costs. For instance, this could be through an additional amount or  
a disregard (see paragraphs 41-46 below).
19. The personal amount is the basic building block of Universal Credit as it is in 
existing benefits. The purpose of the personal amount is to provide for basic living 
costs. It will broadly reflect the current structure of personal allowances in Income 
Support, Jobseeker’s Allowance and the assessment phase of Employment and 
Support Allowance, with single people and couples getting different rates. 
20. As now, there will be lower rates for younger people. The Government will consider 
the scope to simplify the current rules under which lower rates apply to some but 
not all those under the age of 25.
Disability 
21. The Government is absolutely committed to supporting disabled people to 
participate fully in society, including remaining in or returning to work wherever 
feasible. The model introduced in 2008 for the Employment and Support Allowance 
has worked well. This provides additional benefit components for people in the 
Work Related Activity and Support Groups. We intend to mirror this approach in 
Universal Credit. 
22. The Government believes the existing structure of overlapping disability premiums 
is overly complex and causes confusion. We are considering what extra support 
may be needed for disabled people in Universal Credit, over and above the 
additional components mentioned above and the benefits available elsewhere  
in the system.
Caring
23. Carers provide an invaluable service to some of the most vulnerable people in  
our communities and the Government wants to make sure they get the support 
they need. 
24. For too long, the current system of carer benefits has failed to meet the different 
needs of carers and has trapped some people on benefits. The key issues are: 
a.  People receiving Carer’s Allowance can only earn up to the earnings limit 
(currently £100 per week) – but above that limit all of the Carer’s Allowance  
is lost.
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b.  Carer’s Allowance is paid at a lower rate than other income-replacement 
benefits (currently £53.90). All governments, since 1976, when Invalid Care 
Allowance was introduced, have faced the dilemma that increasing the level 
of benefit is neither affordable nor cost effective. Hence Carer’s Allowance 
has stayed at this level, playing an ineffective role, neither effective in poverty 
prevention nor in meeting the wider needs of carers. We can only deliver proper 
support for carers with the greatest financial burden by addressing the current 
confusing interactions between Carer’s Allowance and other benefits. 
25. Most carers of working age want to retain a foothold in the labour market, not just 
for their financial well-being, but also to enhance their own lives and the lives of 
those for whom they care. We intend as part of these reforms to provide support 
for carers and improve their opportunities to maintain links with the world of work.
26. Carers will also continue to be eligible for National Insurance credits, to protect 
their financial position in retirement. 
27. The Government is carefully considering whether changes to Carer’s Allowance  
will be necessary to take account of the introduction of Universal Credit and 
provide clearer, more effective support for carers. 
Housing costs
28. An appropriate amount will be added to the Universal Credit award to help meet 
the cost of rent and mortgage interest. For those who rent their accommodation, 
this amount will be similar to the support currently provided through Housing 
Benefit. The intention is that this support for rent, currently delivered by Local 
Authorities, will over several years be replaced by Universal Credit. 
29. Our aim is to simplify provision for rent support in Universal Credit as much 
as possible, while protecting potentially vulnerable people from unintended 
consequences, such as getting into arrears or being made homeless. As announced 
in the Budget, we will set the amount we pay to support people in the private-
rented sector at a level that will generally make the lowest third of market rents 
affordable. Rates will be set and uprated to ensure that the support received is fair 
but not excessive. 
30. For social-rented sector tenants (including those who rent properties with the new 
shorter tenures and affordable rents), the housing component will build on the 
support currently provided by the current Housing Benefit system, based on actual 
rents in both housing association and Local Authority properties, including in the 
new ‘affordable rent’ tenure. We have already announced our intention to limit 
Housing Benefit payments to social-rented-sector tenants who under-occupy their 
properties. Other than this, we do not anticipate further changes in the short to 
medium term. 
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31. There are advantages in paying the housing component to individuals, rather than 
the current system of payments direct to landlords. This would encourage people to 
manage their own budget in the same way as other households. However, we also 
recognise the importance of stable rental income for social landlords to support 
the delivery of new homes and will develop Universal Credit in a way that protects 
their financial position. Options for achieving this could include some ongoing use 
of direct payments to landlords, use of direct debits, and a protection mechanism 
which safeguards landlords’ income. We will work closely with the devolved 
administrations, providers and lenders in developing the new system. 
32. There are many policy and operational issues to work through in respect of housing. 
The Government will work closely with Local Authorities and the housing sector as 
plans develop.
33. We will consider whether changes are needed to the current approach to calculating 
help with mortgage costs to ensure it is consistent with Universal Credit principles.  
In the longer-term, we believe it should be possible to provide support more 
efficiently, and we will be exploring the full range of options.
Council Tax costs 
34. The Government has announced that Local Authorities will be given a greater  
say in decisions on helping people on low incomes pay their Council Tax alongside  
a 10 per cent reduction in Council Tax Benefit expenditure from 2013-14. The present 
system for providing help with Council Tax bills is Council Tax Benefit, which is 
administered by Local Authorities but on the basis of rules set centrally. 
35. By reducing the amount of Council Tax that people on low incomes have to pay, 
Council Tax Benefit is, in effect, a rebate scheme. Indeed many, notably the Royal 
British Legion, have argued that it should be renamed the Council Tax Rebate.  
36. The change the Government has now announced will go much further than that.  
The introduction of Universal Credit provides the opportunity to sweep away some  
of the centrally imposed complexities of Council Tax Benefit that make it difficult  
for people to understand. There is more work to be done on the practicalities of  
the new approach and the Department for Communities and Local Government 
and the Department for Work and Pensions will work closely together with local 
government and the devolved administrations to develop detailed proposals.  
In doing so the Government will aim to protect the most vulnerable, particularly 
pensioners, and should not undermine the positive impact of Universal Credit on 
work incentives. 
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37. Local Authorities will be given scope to take account of the priorities of their own 
local communities when determining the amount of support for vulnerable and low 
income households to meet their Council Tax bills. Local Authorities will be better 
able to provide a joined-up system of support for people on low incomes that 
dovetails with the various rebate and discount schemes which are already part of 
the Council Tax regime, while at the same time protecting vulnerable groups. While 
the aim is for a more cost effective system overall, any new administrative burdens 
on Local Authorities will, as a matter of principle, be funded by the Department for 
Work and Pensions in the usual way. It will be particularly important to ensure that, 
wherever possible, Local Authorities can make use of household data collected by 
the Department for Work and Pensions through the Universal Credit system, rather 
than asking people to provide details of their income and savings more than once. 
Children
38. The Government is committed to providing the financial support less-well-off 
families need to cover children’s living costs. We will therefore include fixed 
amounts within Universal Credit to provide for these costs. The amounts will be 
based on those currently provided through Child Tax Credit. They will be additional 
to Child Benefit.
39. The Government will consider the structure of support for disabled children in the 
Universal Credit as we look at the structure for disabled adults. 
40. The Government intends to keep the current principle in benefits and Tax Credits 
that, where parents are separated and provide shared care, only one of them will  
be eligible to receive the child element of Universal Credit. 
Childcare 
41. Ensuring that parents continue to receive financial support with the costs of 
childcare is crucial if they are to have an incentive to work. Parents in receipt  
of Working Tax Credits can currently receive additional support through the 
Childcare Element which, from April 2011, will pay up to 70 per cent of costs up  
to a maximum of £175 a week for one child and £300 for two or more children. 
42. We recognise that people often find the current childcare element confusing.  
The need to calculate average awards can be particularly complicated. Covering 
only a proportion of costs and paying this as part of the overall benefit award 
can cause uncertainty about how much support parents receive. The new system 
provides an opportunity to improve and simplify the way support is offered but we 
need to ensure that it remains fair, affordable and targeted to those most in need.
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43. The Government would welcome views from key stakeholders and will work with 
them to establish how support for childcare could best be delivered as part of, 
or alongside, Universal Credit. In developing options, the Government will take 
account of the evidence collected from recent pilots designed to test different 
ways of accessing the childcare element of Tax Credits. 
44. As a minimum, it would be feasible to pay an additional element for childcare on 
top of the basic Universal Credit award, at similar rates to those currently offered, 
but to simplify the way costs are calculated and support is paid. If information 
about costs was collected through a self-service process this could improve the 
timeliness of support and reduce the scope for under and overpayments. 
45. But there may be better approaches. For example:
•  providing support for childcare through a voucher or discount system, rather 
than as part of the Universal Credit award;
•  recognising childcare through an additional earnings disregard rather than  
an additional payment. 
46. Help with childcare for people on Universal Credit would be restricted to those  
in work. The aim would be to allocate some of the current support to those  
working fewer than 16 hours, so that all types of work are rewarded.  
Upper age limit 
47. Universal Credit will replace Housing Benefit and Child Tax Credit for people of 
working age. We therefore need to consider how best to support pensioners with 
the cost of rent and dependent children. 
48. It is important to provide continuity for older people in getting the help and 
support they need. The Government therefore plans to make some changes to 
Pension Credit. These changes will consolidate support for rent with the help 
available for other housing costs within Pension Credit, and add a further  
element to provide income-related help for pensioners with dependent children.
49. However, Pension Credit may not be appropriate for all pensioners. Pension  
Credit is designed for the needs of the majority of low-income pensioners and  
is not intended to provide in-work support. As pensioners will no longer be able 
to access help from Working Tax Credit, we are considering an option of allowing 
those pensioners who choose to extend their working lives to claim Universal 
Credit, rather than Pension Credit, so that they can take advantage of the tailored 
in-work arrangements. We would welcome views on this approach.
50. Otherwise, the upper age limit for Universal Credit will be the age at which people 
are eligible for Pension Credit, which is currently linked to State Pension age for 
women and, on current plans, will be 65 for both men and women in 2018. 
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National Insurance credits
51. The Government will review eligibility for National Insurance credits towards State 
Pension for those in receipt of Universal Credit. Most people currently receiving 
credits will continue to do so during periods when they receive Universal Credit.  
Where people fail to meet some conditionality requirements there may be a case 
for preventing these people from gaining National Insurance credits.
Maximum award of Universal Credit
52. The cap on household benefit payments announced in the Spending Review  
will mean that the award of Universal Credit cannot exceed a maximum amount 
when combined with Child Benefit and other non-Universal Credit payments such 
as contributory Jobseeker’s Allowance and Employment and Support Allowance. 
This maximum will be set on the basis of median earnings after tax and National 
Insurance for working families. As announced in the Spending Review, Disability 
Living Allowance recipients and War Widows will be exempt from this cap.  
Under Universal Credit there will also be an exemption for working families 
equivalent to the exemption announced in the Spending Review for families  
on Working Tax Credit.
What remains outside of Universal Credit 
53. Universal Credit will replace most of the benefits and Tax Credits that currently 
provide means-tested support apart from Council Tax Benefit. As noted above,  
we are planning to give Local Authorities a greater say in the help that people  
on low incomes get with their Council Tax bills in ways that will protect the  
most vulnerable and complement Universal Credit. 
54. It will not replace any of the following non-means-tested benefits: 
•  Contributory Jobseeker’s Allowance and contributory Employment and  
Support Allowance. These will continue to exist but with the treatment of 
earnings aligned with the way earnings are treated within Universal Credit  
(see chapter 6); 
• Disability Living Allowance (see chapter 6); 
•  Child Benefit, which will be available in addition to Universal Credit payments  
for children; and
•  We also believe that bereavement benefits, Statutory Sick Pay, Statutory 
Maternity Pay, Maternity Allowance and Industrial Injuries Disablement  
Benefit are not suitable for replacement by the Universal Credit.
55. We will need to consider the implications for payments, such as the In-Work  
Credit for lone parents and Job Grant, which provide additional financial  
incentives and help smooth the move into work in ways which may not be  
needed under Universal Credit. 
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3Conditionality  and sanctions  
Individuals who are able to look for or prepare for work should be required to  
do so as a condition of receiving benefit, and those who fail to meet their 
responsibilities should face a financial sanction. This is known as conditionality. 
We will introduce a ‘claimant commitment’ to clearly set out what is expected of 
each recipient. We will raise the requirements placed on some individuals and will 
introduce tougher sanctions to ensure recipients meet their responsibilities. 
This approach will be introduced in existing benefits and Universal Credit. 
Under Universal Credit, requirements will be set according to individual capability  
and circumstance. There will be four broad conditionality groups: 
• full conditionality – jobseekers; 
• work preparation – people with a disability or those with a health condition  
which means they have limited capability for work at the current time;
• keeping in touch with the labour market – lone parent or lead carer in a  
couple with a child over age one but below age five; and
• no conditionality – people with a disability or health condition which prevents 
them from working, carers, lone parents or lead carers with a child under the  
age of one. 
Conditionality under Universal Credit will apply up to a threshold. Initially this 
threshold will be set at broadly the same point at which people lose entitlement  
to out-of-work benefits. In the future, however, it will be possible to raise the  
threshold to apply conditionality to greater numbers of recipients.  
People receiving Universal Credit but earning above the relevant threshold would  
not be subject to conditionality. Those in work but earning below the threshold  
would be in the conditionality group applicable to their circumstances.
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Conditionality 
1.  Universal Credit will make sure that work pays for benefit recipients and our 
package of employment support – including the new, integrated Work Programme 
– will allow us to respond flexibly to recipients’ needs. In return, we expect 
recipients to do everything that can reasonably be expected of them to find work 
or prepare for work in the future as a condition of receiving support. 
2.  Currently three levels of work-related conditionality apply to benefit recipients, 
determined by the benefit claimed.
Changes to the existing regime 
3.  We will introduce important changes to the existing conditionality and sanctions 
regime to strengthen the link between people receiving benefits and meeting  
their responsibilities.  
4.  This will involve:
a.  increasing the level of conditionality that is applied to some recipients; 
b.   ensuring recipients fully understand what is expected of them by introducing 
a claimant commitment;
c.   improving the sanctions regime so that it more effectively encourages recipients 
to meet their responsibilities; and
d.  introducing Mandatory Work Activity so that some recipients will be required 
to take part in full-time work activity for four weeks.
5.  We will begin to make these changes in the existing benefits system and they  
will be carried forward under Universal Credit, with adjustments as necessary.
6.  Financial support will remain unconditional for people who we do not expect to be 
able to work or prepare for work. None of the changes set out in this White Paper 
change that basic principle.
Increasing expectations
7.  We believe we can ask some recipients to do more in return for receiving current 
benefits and have decided that ahead of the introduction of Universal Credit:
a.   Employment and Support Allowance recipients who are capable of doing so may 
be required to take part in work-related activity to help them prepare to move 
into work;
b.   as announced in the Budget, lone parents whose youngest child has reached 
the age of five will need to actively seek work unless they are disabled or have  
a health condition which prevents them working, or are a carer; and
c.   couples with children whose youngest child has reached the age of five, and 
where neither partner is disabled or has a health condition which prevents them 
working or is a carer, will need to make a joint claim to Jobseeker’s Allowance, 
requiring both partners to actively seek work.
8.  Under existing benefits a person on low earnings could still be receiving one of  
the out-of-work benefits. People in this position have the same conditionality  
level applied to them as a person receiving that benefit and having no earnings.
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Personalised conditionality
9.  As now, jobseekers will be required to actively seek and be available for work and 
we will continue to carry out regular checks to ensure recipients are meeting their 
conditionality requirements.
10.  In setting conditionality, advisers will ensure that the requirements they place 
on a recipient are reasonable for that person, taking into account their particular 
capabilities and circumstances. In line with this personalised approach, we will 
continue to give advisers the flexibility to target stronger conditionality on some 
jobseekers where they think this is necessary to help move them into work. 
11.  In particular, we will enable advisers to: require some jobseekers to attend their local 
office more frequently to demonstrate the steps they have been taking to return  
to work; require some people to broaden their job search earlier in their claim; and 
raise the number of steps they expect a customer to take in any week to have the  
best prospects of finding work. Advisers will also be given clear powers to mandate 
people in both the work preparation and active job search categories to undertake 
activity to address a skills need, such as training, which will aid their movement  
into work. If people do not meet their responsibilities, a sanction will typically follow 
(see paragraph 14) but, as now, good cause must be taken into account so that where 
there are reasonable mitigating circumstances, a sanction will not be imposed.
Commitment and sanctions 
12.  We will require every Income Support, Jobseeker’s Allowance and Employment and 
Support Allowance recipient to have a claimant commitment. The commitment will 
set out our general expectations of recipients, and the requirements placed upon 
them; it will also be clear about the consequences for the recipient of failing to  
meet these agreed standards. This will be carried forward into Universal Credit. 
13.  Having strong and clear sanctions are critical to incentivise benefit recipients to 
meet their responsibilities. Currently, we believe that some sanctions are set at too 
low a level and the consequences of failing to comply with requirements are not 
always clear. We will introduce a new sanctions structure to apply across Jobseeker’s 
Allowance, Employment and Support Allowance, and Income Support (as now, 
sanctions will not apply to associated benefits such as Housing Benefit).
14.  Our current proposals for financial sanctions are:
a.   Failure to meet a requirement to prepare for work (applicable to jobseekers and 
those in the Employment and Support Allowance Work-Related Activity Group) 
will lead to 100 per cent of payments ceasing until the recipient re-complies with 
requirements and for a fixed period after re-compliance (fixed period sanctions start 
at one week, rising to two, then four weeks with each subsequent failure to comply). 
b.   Failure to actively seek employment or be available for work will lead to payment 
ceasing for four weeks for a first failure and up to three months for a second.
c.   The most serious failures that apply only to jobseekers will lead to Jobseeker’s 
Allowance payment ceasing for a fixed period of at least three months (longer 
for repeat offences). Actions that could trigger this level of penalty include failure 
to accept a reasonable job offer, failure to apply for a job or failure to attend 
Mandatory Work Activity.
d   Some types of recipient, such as lone parents with young children, are only 
required to attend work-focused interviews and their failure to attend is more 
often due to challenging circumstances than wilful evasion of the rules. Therefore, 
we are improving our methods of ensuring lone parents know about and are able 
to comply with their responsibilities. However, we will impose a financial sanction 
where necessary that is broadly in line with current arrangements.
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15.  Most people want to find work and will never be in the position of facing a sanction. 
The aim of our changes is to make the consequences of failure clearer and simpler. 
We anticipate that most people who are sanctioned will receive a lower level 
sanction and indeed the majority of people are only ever sanctioned once. For 
those who repeatedly fail to meet their responsibility to look for work there will be 
progression through the sanctions regime to the tougher penalties. Recipients in 
this category will have had many opportunities to demonstrate engagement and 
will have been clearly warned of the consequences of continued non-compliance. 
The penalty of losing three years of Jobseeker’s Allowance will apply to the most 
extreme cases, where benefit recipients have serially and deliberately breached 
conditions, and where other sanctions have not worked to change their behaviour. 
Recipients will continue to be able to show good cause and, as now, after a 
sanction has been imposed, recipients will continue to have the ability to appeal. 
We will also maintain safeguards for vulnerable people and ensure that mental 
health and substance abuse problems are taken into consideration.
16.  As now hardship payments will be available to benefit recipients in need who 
receive a sanction (and given the new sanctions structure we will ensure this 
includes Employment and Support Allowance recipients). We are considering 
replacing the current system of hardship payments with loans to the extent 
that is possible. We also want to consider ways of ensuring that those who 
persistently fail to meet the requirements imposed upon them cannot rely on 
these alternative sources of support for the entire duration of their sanction. This 
will help ensure a better balance in the system and should help incentivise people 
to meet their commitments, both within the current benefit system and Universal 
Credit. However, we remain committed to protecting vulnerable people and their 
dependants. Therefore, hardship payments will continue to be paid where relevant.
Mandatory Work Activity
17.  Mandatory Work Activity will be part of the toolkit that Jobcentre Plus advisers 
will have available to them. Where advisers believe a jobseeker will benefit from 
experiencing the habits and routines of working life, they will have the power to 
refer the recipient to Mandatory Work Activity. The placement will be for up to four 
weeks and aimed at helping the recipient develop the labour-market discipline 
associated with full-time employment such as attending on time and regularly, 
carrying out specific tasks and working under supervision. 
18.  Requiring a small group of recipients to engage in full-time activity will give them 
the opportunity to demonstrate their compliance with the Jobseeker’s regime.  
If a recipient fails without good cause to attend or complete the placement, 
then we will impose a significant financial sanction. This could be, for example, 
withholding Jobseeker’s Allowance for at least three months.
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Conditionality under Universal Credit
19.  The structures outlined above will provide the basis of the conditionality and 
sanctions system under Universal Credit. People will be placed into groups 
mirroring the four conditionality levels being introduced under existing benefits: 
a.   Full conditionality. This will be the default option for recipients including lone 
parents and couples with older children. Recipients in this group will be subject 
to the same requirements to actively seek work and to be available for work as 
they would under Jobseeker’s Allowance.
b.   Work preparation. Recipients will be in this group if they are disabled or have 
a health condition which means they have limited capability for work at the 
current time. They will be expected to take reasonable steps to prepare for work.
c.   Keeping in touch with the labour market. Recipients will be in this group if they 
are a lone parent or lead carer in a couple with a child over one but below age 
five. They will be expected to attend periodic interviews to discuss their plans  
for returning to the labour market.
d.  No conditionality. Recipients will be in this group if they are: disabled or have a 
serious health condition which prevents them working and preparing for work; 
a lone parent or lead carer in a couple with a child younger than one; or have 
intensive and regular caring responsibilities. People receiving Universal Credit but 
earning above the relevant threshold would also not be subject to conditionality.
20.  Each adult in a household will have conditionality applied to them as an individual; 
that is they will be placed into their own conditionality group with appropriate 
requirements. In the case of a couple with children, the couple will need to 
nominate which of them is the lead carer. 
21.  Conditionality under Universal Credit will apply up to a ‘conditionality threshold’. 
Recipients above the threshold will be placed into the no-conditionality group. 
To begin with, we intend to set the threshold at broadly the same point at which 
people lose entitlement to the current out-of-work benefits. However, once 
Universal Credit is established we will be able to raise or lower this threshold  
and apply conditionality to a greater number of recipients. 
22.  This will enable us to encourage people to increase their earnings and hours in a 
way that we have never been able to do before, helping people along a journey 
toward financial independence from the state. 
23.  The amount sanctioned under Universal Credit will be broadly equivalent  
to the amount that will be sanctioned under the current benefits system,  
that is, an amount equivalent to Jobseeker’s Allowance or Employment and 
Support Allowance.
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Summary 
Universal Credit will transform existing labour market and benefits services  
to deliver a more efficient, informative and streamlined experience for people.  
The Department for Work and Pensions will be responsible for the delivery of 
Universal Credit and will make extensive use of online technology to allow people  
to better manage their claim and understand the benefits of entering paid work.  
We expect to start taking claims for Universal Credit from October 2013. 
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Introduction
1.  The existing benefit system is characterised by overlaps and duplication. It can be 
cumbersome and inefficient to administer and confusing and onerous for individuals 
to navigate. Many recipients have to deal with several different national and local 
government bodies, providing the same information multiple times. The Department  
for Work and Pensions will be the single government department with responsibility  
for the delivery of Universal Credit.
2.  The shortcomings of the current system are as frustrating for those who operate  
it as they are for those who depend upon it. These reforms will allow resources to  
be targeted more effectively, providing more help to those who need it most.
3.  The proposed delivery system will lessen bureaucracy and reduce the risk for people 
moving from benefits to work by making the system more responsive to fluctuations 
in earnings. People will be able to access information and job search support directly, 
without the form filling and delays that characterise much of the current system.
Delivery design principles
4.  The introduction of Universal Credit provides the opportunity to transform the delivery 
of in- and out-of-work benefits into a service fit for the 21st century. The Government’s 
principles of increasing access to online services and maximising service efficiency lie at 
the heart of our delivery proposals for Universal Credit. Our approach to delivery aims to: 
•   minimise the need for recipients to contact government, unless integral to managing 
conditionality, preventing fraud or error or providing support;
•   maximise use of online channels to provide straightforward and accessible 
information about claims and better job search support whilst providing  
focused help for those unable to use online channels;
•   ensure the continuous delivery of high-quality, joined-up, effective and  
consistent service;
•   minimise disruption to recipients and organisations during the transition to  
Universal Credit;
•   work closely with partner delivery organisations to develop a service to meet  
the diverse needs of recipients; 
•  build in flexibility to allow for delivery of wider services in the future; and
•  maximise overall government efficiency.
Claiming Universal Credit
5.  Claims will be made on the basis of households rather than individuals and both 
members of a couple will be required to claim Universal Credit. Claims for Universal 
Credit will normally be made through the internet and we expect that most subsequent 
contact between recipients and the delivery agency will also be conducted online. 
People will be able to obtain all elements of Universal Credit through a single application, 
ending the excessive form filling of the current system, reducing scope for error and 
reducing administration costs.
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6.  This approach builds on existing plans to develop full online services that will 
deliver a more automated, informative and responsive service for recipients.  
These changes will enable the targeting of resources to support vulnerable  
people with additional needs.
7.  Claim, assessment and award calculations will usually be made automatically so 
will be quicker and more efficient to process, allowing staff to focus on dealing  
with complex cases or those where there is a risk of fraud or error.
8.  Recipients will have an online account through which they will be able to access 
information about their claim and Universal Credit payments, much like the 
options that online banking services currently offer. The financial rewards from 
work will also be made clearer, with recipients able to view online the positive 
effect of increased earnings on their household income.
9.  Recipients will report significant changes of circumstance online. For changes of 
circumstance such as moving into work, losing a job, having a child or becoming 
sick, in most cases there will be an automatic re-assessment, providing a faster 
and more reliable experience than at present.
10.  We will use existing information from relevant sources as much as possible to 
avoid people having to repeat themselves when making a claim or reporting 
a change in circumstance providing information. During the transition period, 
however, recipients may be asked to provide us with greater levels of information 
to ensure that all data in the new system is correct from the outset.
11.  If members of a household claiming Universal Credit find their total earnings 
increase to the point that they no longer receive any benefit, it is likely that we will 
not remove them from the Universal Credit system. Instead, the award will remain 
open for a fixed period, perhaps three months, so that it can be reactivated and 
payment made without the need for a new claim if the household becomes eligible 
for Universal Credit within that time.
Payment periods 
12.  Universal Credit focuses on encouraging personal responsibility. In line with this 
approach and the need for consistency with the real-time earnings approach that 
we are proposing, we are considering whether the period of the assessment and 
the frequency of payments should be monthly. About 75 per cent of all earnings 
are paid monthly, including most of those in the lower-earnings brackets. Rent and 
other major household bills are also usually paid monthly, rather than weekly.
13.  We understand that many people on low incomes will be used to managing 
fortnightly payments of benefits and will ensure that, whatever the period of 
payment, there will be appropriate budgeting support to ensure recipients are 
supported effectively. We want families to be able to manage their financial affairs  
in a manner that best reflects the demands of modern life, whether in or out of work. 
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How Universal Credit will be calculated and paid
14.  The assessment of Universal Credit will have two stages. A gross entitlement will 
be calculated by the Department for Work and Pensions based on information 
already held or provided by the recipient including information about any income 
they have, other than earnings. For recipients who are not working and who satisfy 
all the conditions of entitlement, this is the amount they will be paid. 
15.  Recipients who have earnings from employment will have those earnings 
automatically taken into account. We intend to use HM Revenue & Customs 
proposed real-time information system to identify earnings and to calculate  
the net Universal Credit payment due by applying the appropriate taper to the 
gross payment. This means that those recipients who receive earnings through Pay 
As You Earn will not need to inform us for payment purposes if the amount of their 
earnings change. Recipients will, though, still need to tell us about other changes 
to their circumstances which affect their entitlement to benefit, or the conditions 
they must meet.
16.  We will also provide for those who are outside the Pay As You Earn system, such  
as the self employed, to ensure that Universal Credit payments take into account 
all household earnings.
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How Universal Credit will work in practice
17.  Figure 10 shows how a Universal Credit award might be administered under 
different circumstances, once a claim has been made online, has been  
awarded and is then in payment.
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Moving existing recipients onto Universal Credit 
18.  Our current intention is that we will start to take new claims to Universal Credit 
from October 2013. We want to ensure that the transition process is conducted 
as smoothly and efficiently as possible. This is a significant project, affecting 19 
million individual claims and an estimated eight million households. In planning 
the transition to the new system we are being guided by principles of simplicity, 
fairness and affordability.
19.  Some existing recipients will move to Universal Credit by a process of natural 
transition, where in the current system they would otherwise have moved  
between existing out-of-work benefits and Tax Credits. Other existing awards  
will form part of a managed transition.
20.  When an existing award to a current benefit ends and the recipient is to be  
instead awarded Universal Credit, that award will be a household award.  
In couple households, therefore, the other member will cease to be entitled to 
existing benefits and will become part of the household award for Universal Credit. 
21.  A provisional timetable has been developed with a view to completing the transfer 
to Universal Credit by October 2017:
October 2013 to  
April 2014
All new claims for out-of-work support are treated as claims to Universal 
Credit. No new Jobseeker’s Allowance, Employment and Support 
Allowance, Income Support and Housing Benefit claims will be accepted. 
Customers transitioning from out-of-work benefits into work will move 
onto Universal Credit if they are eligible. 
April 2014 No new claims are made to Tax Credits.
April 2014 to  
October 2017
During this time we would begin to work through existing cases. 
Conditionality
22.  Requiring recipients of benefit to meet conditionality appropriate to their 
circumstances and earnings will remain a key part of delivery under Universal 
Credit. As outlined in the conditionality and sanctions chapter, each recipient 
(whether an individual or each member of the couple) will have conditionality 
applied to them as an individual.
Customer contact and access
23.  Previous sections have described how the usual methods for making and 
maintaining claims will be online. This is entirely consistent with wider reforms  
to transform the way individuals access public services through online channels.
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24.  The Government has been clear in stating its commitment to providing better, 
more transparent and efficient services that allow individuals greater control and 
influence over their interactions with government. Enabling recipients to access 
services online is central to this agenda and so digital channels will become the 
default option for the delivery of Government services. This will help to ensure  
that essential services are easier to access and cheaper to provide. 
25.  In delivering Universal Credit the Department for Work and Pensions will 
adopt the ‘digital first’ principle and meet the growing demand for flexible and 
comprehensive online services. For people making Universal Credit claims, 
notifying changes or checking their payments and responsibilities, the digital 
channel will be the primary contact route. This will free up more adviser time  
to deliver valuable face-to-face back-to-work support. 
26.  When Universal Credit is introduced, many people will already be familiar with 
using online services to contact us. The Department for Work and Pensions already 
receives claims for Jobseeker’s Allowance through Directgov and will soon be 
launching online services for recipients to check information and notify us of 
changes. We will be increasingly expecting people to use these services prior to 
introducing Universal Credit. So, although we do not underestimate the challenge 
of changing customer behaviour to use new channels (which will include smart 
phones and automated telephony as well as PC-based access), the intent is entirely 
consistent with existing plans both in the Department for Work and Pensions and 
broader government. The quality of the online service will be important to get 
right. The Department for Work and Pensions will build on its growing experience 
of delivering these channels to ensure that the Universal Credit online systems  
are simple, secure, intuitive and attractive to people.
27.  The Department for Work and Pensions recognises that there will continue to be a 
minority of people who cannot use online channels. For these people we will offer 
alternative access routes, predominantly by phone but also face to face for those 
who really need it. We expect these alternative access routes to be reserved for 
the minority who can’t use, or be helped to use, online services and therefore kept 
to a minimum. For face-to-face help in particular, we will consider how best to work 
with partners to meet this need. There are also circumstances when conditionality 
interventions are more effective when delivered face-to-face. Where this is the 
case, we will continue to deliver these interventions through this channel. 
Labour market services
28.  A strong and supportive labour market service will be an integral part of the 
new welfare system. Jobcentre Plus support for getting people back into work is 
internationally acclaimed. As set out in previous chapters, the Government expects 
Jobcentre Plus to continue delivering this part of the system, strengthened by 
a range of new measures focused on getting people back to work. In addition, 
Jobcentre Plus advisers will be given greater freedom to determine what help 
recipients need to return to work.
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29.  The new Work Programme will replace many of the current back-to-work programmes 
and will provide personalised help to people based on their needs. Alongside the Work 
Programme the Government will introduce a number of additional support options 
which will:
•  encourage and support people to move into self employment; 
•  enable unemployed people to share skills and experiences; 
•   encourage and support volunteering as a way of developing and maintaining  
work skills; and
•  provide more work experience, apprenticeships and further education places.
30.  In order to provide local solutions to local labour market challenges, Jobcentre Plus 
will further empower its district managers. They will be given greater autonomy on 
how to allocate their resources and design their services, including a greater say in 
how they work with other local partners. The Government expects greater partnership 
working, so Local Authorities, charities and voluntary groups can work together with 
Jobcentre Plus managers.
Impact on current delivery organisations 
31.  Universal Credit will transform the service standards in the welfare systems leading 
to a significant reduction in administration costs and better value for money for 
the taxpayer. These changes will have significant impacts on those organisations 
currently administering benefits and Tax Credits. As these benefits and credits make 
way for Universal Credit, the roles and responsibilities of Jobcentre Plus and the 
Pension, Disability and Carers Service within the Department for Work and Pensions, 
HM Revenue & Customs and Local Authorities throughout the country will all change.
32.  Within the current system many different functions are duplicated across these 
organisations, including recipient contact and validation, benefit processing, 
payments, and fraud and error policing. A single organisation will deliver Universal 
Credit, enabling this waste and inefficiency to be eliminated. The Government has 
decided that the administration of Universal Credit should be organised by the 
Department for Work and Pensions. The Department for Work and Pensions already 
administers the main out of work benefits and operates employment and labour 
market services, and this link between so called ‘active’ labour market measures  
and the benefit system is widely recognised as vital.
33.  The Department for Work and Pensions will be responsible for the implementation 
and administration of Universal Credit, but there remain a variety of options for 
operational arrangements. The new IT required for Universal Credit is of similar scale 
to that needed for the recent introduction of Employment and Support Allowance 
which was successfully delivered on time and within budget. The Department for 
Work and Pensions and its suppliers are confident of delivering the systems needed 
for Universal Credit to meet the implementation timetable. 
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34.  The potential implications and opportunities for Local Authorities are significant. 
The Department for Work and Pensions will hold further discussions with Local 
Authorities and their associations about the detail and implications of Universal 
Credit for their Housing Benefit operations and of the new approach to Council 
Tax costs. This will include considering whether there may still be a role for Local 
Authorities in dealing with non-mainstream Housing Benefit cases (for example, 
people living in supported or temporary accommodation). Local Authorities may  
also have a role to play in delivering face-to-face contact for those who cannot  
use other channels to claim and manage their Universal Credit. 
35.  Currently many people also look to voluntary sector organisations for advice and 
support in dealing with the system, and these organisations often devote effort to 
chasing progress on benefit claims and correcting errors. Improved service delivery 
and greater transparency and certainty resulting from Universal Credit should help 
voluntary organisations to perform this role more easily and effectively.
36.  These welfare reforms are significant and will transform the way welfare services 
are delivered. This chapter has described the broad outlines of this transformation 
and detailed work is ongoing to assess how best to organise the new system. This 
will be a substantial change programme and full implementation will be carefully 
managed over several years. Each component of the programme will build on 
existing experience of successfully delivering projects both for transferring people 
from one benefit to another and for implementing new IT for benefit processing. 
It will require two moderate scale IT developments to link into HM Revenue & 
Customs’ reformed Pay As You Earn system. In doing this the Department for  
Work and Pensions will work closely with colleagues in HM Revenue & Customs  
and Local Authorities, as well as partners in the private and voluntary sectors. 
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5Reducing fraud  and error 
Summary  
The current welfare system is prone to fraud and error because:
• it is complex and difficult to understand and navigate;
•  we rely on customers to keep us informed about their financial and  
non-financial circumstances;
• it can encourage fraud as for many work simply doesn’t pay; and
• there is a lack of suitable IT, training and incentives for staff.
Universal Credit will reduce the scope for fraud and error as it should be simpler  
and easier to understand; will enable us to know people’s circumstances better 
through the real-time earnings system; and will make work pay by allowing those 
moving into work to keep more of what they earn.
While the Universal Credit will have a significant impact on levels of error and  
fraud in the welfare system, it will not be able to eliminate all wasteful expenditure. 
The Department has already announced a new programme to both protect the 
integrity of the new system and tackle fraud and error which sits outside the  
scope of Universal Credit.
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1. The design of the current welfare system makes it highly susceptible to fraud and 
error – the total level of fraud and error overpayments in the benefits and Tax 
Credits system is estimated at £5.2 billion a year, accounting for three per cent  
of total welfare spending. 
2. Both over and underpayments undermine public confidence in the benefits and 
Tax Credits system.
3. A simpler system will reduce the scope for error by both staff and recipients and, 
by allowing people to keep more of their money as they move into work, will make 
legitimate work a rational choice for recipients.
Causes of fraud and error in the current system
4. Fraud and error in the current welfare system derive from:
a.  The complex and fragmented nature of the system: this causes errors amongst 
staff and the public and enables people to represent themselves differently to 
different parts of the system, often inadvertently.
b.  Means-testing rules: we rely on people to let us know about their earnings, 
savings and non-financial circumstances and this creates opportunities for  
fraud and error. In Tax Credits, the lack of real-time earnings data means that 
people are only assessed annually, often resulting in overpayments which are 
difficult to repay. 
c.  The system incentivises fraud: the design of the current system means that, for 
a number of recipients, work simply doesn’t pay. This is reinforced by damaging 
social and media perceptions which suggest that ‘everyone is at it’ and by 
perceived weaknesses in the sanctions regime for those who do commit fraud.  
d.  IT, training and incentives for staff: administrative staff are not always 
equipped with the standard of IT or level of training they need to do their job  
as effectively as possible and can face an incentive system which promotes 
other priorities over processing accuracy.
Impacts of a Universal Credit system
Reducing complexity and supporting staff
5. The replacement of an array of working-age benefits with a single Universal Credit 
should drive down complexity in the welfare system. It will become much easier 
for recipients and staff to understand and establish entitlement to payments, 
meaning much of the error which is currently caused by the complicated 
interactions between different benefits will be reduced.
6. It is also expected that the Universal Credit will be processed and administered 
using an integrated computer system and integrated processing teams, thus 
driving out much of the fraud and error which arises due to complex interactions 
between such systems. 
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Knowing people’s circumstances
7. Currently, misreported earnings are one of the largest causes of error and  
fraud in the benefits and Tax Credits system. This misreporting can be deliberate 
and fraudulent, or often accidental as a consequence of the complexity of the 
current system.
8. The real-time earnings system presents us with a real opportunity to reduce 
misreported earnings by giving us timely and accurate information on most 
people’s earnings, rather than relying on cumbersome paper-based self-reporting.
9. As well as reducing the scope for fraud and error, the real-time earnings system 
will free recipients from the worry of filling in lengthy income and earnings forms 
while helping to ensure that they receive the correct level of support. 
Making work pay
10. For long-term benefit recipients, small amounts of work can be a very positive 
way in which to refresh skills, gain valuable experience and rebuild confidence. 
However, small amounts of work are discouraged by the current benefits system.
11. While fraud can never be condoned, we must also recognise that the current 
system can incentivise fraud as the most rational option for those who are on 
benefits but want to work. 
12. Universal Credit will disincentivise this behaviour by allowing those moving into 
work to keep more of what they earn. It will encourage people on benefits to 
work as a route off benefits and will reduce support gradually as earned income 
increases. It will not alter the behaviour of all of those committing earnings fraud, 
but will play an important role for those on the margins between committing fraud 
and complying with the rules. 
Continuing the fight against fraud and error
13. While the Universal Credit will have a significant impact on levels of fraud and  
error in the welfare system it is not a panacea, and will not be able to eliminate  
all wasteful expenditure. This is why the Government published on 18 October, 17 
a new fraud and error strategy which outlines a new programme of work that will 
tackle areas falling outside the scope of Universal Credit, as well as providing the 
Department with the infrastructure needed to help protect the integrity of the 
Universal Credit system. 
14. A key driver of this will be a renewal of the Department’s programme to deter 
fraud. Under our new programme we will look to introduce a £50 civil penalty 
which can be administered quickly to those who fail, without good excuse, to 
report changes to personal circumstances. This penalty will be employed to  
make it clear that the Department expects recipients to take their claim seriously. 
17 HM Revenue & Customs and Department for Work and Pensions, October 2010, Tackling Fraud and Error in the benefit 
and tax credit system.
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15. Where there are grounds for instituting criminal proceedings against a person 
in lower level benefit fraud cases, we will consider offering the recipient a tough 
penalty they would have to agree to pay to avoid criminal prosecution. If accepted, 
the recipient would also be subject to four weeks’ loss of benefit payments.
16. In the case of recipients who are convicted of criminal fraud, in addition to any 
sentence imposed by the court, the offender will also be subject to ‘one strike’ and 
‘two strike’ regimes, which impose benefit deductions on recipients. We will seek to 
impose a loss of benefits for three months for a first conviction and six months for 
a second. For the most serious and organised cases of fraud we will look to ensure 
that a benefit loss of at least three years can be applied.
17. As part of this strategy we also intend to put in place a number of mechanisms  
for recovering our debts more effectively. We intend to increase the maximum rate 
at which fraud debts can be recovered through deduction from benefits by almost 
25 per cent.
18. For those debtors who are already subject to a court-authorised deduction from 
benefits, but who have moved off benefits, we will introduce a fast-track system  
for requiring money to be deducted from an employee’s earnings, known as  
Direct Earnings Attachment. Further to this, we will seek powers to share data 
more effectively with HM Revenue & Customs to help us better recover tax and 
benefit debts.
19. Finally, reflecting the greater simplicity of the Universal Credit payment system, 
we will seek powers to enable us to widen the range of debts we can recover, 
to include those resulting from official error. While the Department must take 
responsibility for payments made mistakenly by our staff, that does not give 
recipients the right to hold on to public money not intended for them. 
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6Universal Credit and the wider system . 
Universal Credit is a major reform and will involve changes in other parts of the 
welfare system: 
Contributory benefits 
• Contributory Jobseeker’s Allowance and Employment and Support Allowance  
will remain in their present form but will be administered through the same 
system as Universal Credit. 
• They will be paid in most cases for a limited period only (the Employment and 
Support Allowance Work Related Activity Group component will only be paid  
for one year).
Social Fund 
• Elements that can be automated, such as budgeting loans, will become part  
of Universal Credit.
• More discretionary elements, such as community care grants and crisis loans,  
will be devolved to Local Authorities.
Passported Benefits
• The current benefit dependent thresholds for access to a range of passported 
benefits (for example, free school meals and health benefits) will no longer exist.
• We will replace the current rules with an income or earnings-related system 
that gradually withdraws entitlements to prevent all passported benefits being 
withdrawn at the same time.
Disability Living Allowance will not be part of Universal Credit. We have already 
announced changes to Disability Living Allowance and we intend to consult on  
this separately later in the year.
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1. Whilst protecting people in the most vulnerable circumstances we also want 
to ensure that the state support we provide is properly targeted. We recognise 
the importance of Beveridge’s insurance-based principle and the need to build 
up pension entitlement over time. We also recognise the need for benefits that 
recognise specific needs such as disability. 
2. To ensure this support is properly targeted, we will be reforming contributory 
benefits to ensure consistency with Universal Credit. We will also reform Disability 
Living Allowance to ensure that severely disabled people can participate more 
widely in society. 
3. Universal Credit will also prompt other changes in the wider system. This includes 
the Social Fund and a range of benefits that the Universal Credit may give access 
to, known as passported benefits. 
Contributory benefits
4. Contributory benefits, which are paid on the basis of National Insurance 
contributions, will be reformed but will continue to exist in parallel to the  
Universal Credit.
5. Governments have wrestled with what to do with the contributory principle for 
working-age benefits ever since the Beveridge system was introduced. Piecemeal 
reforms have followed, such as the abolition of earnings-related supplements in 
the 1980s, restricting the period of entitlement to unemployment benefits in the 
1990s and means testing Incapacity Benefit from 2001 in respect of income from 
occupational pensions. These proposals are consistent with that direction of travel 
and recognise the fact that we need to allocate limited resources where they will 
have the best effect.
6. Under the new system, contributory benefits would retain an insurance element, 
but in most circumstances would only be paid for a fixed period, only to facilitate  
a transition back to work. 
7. Contributory Jobseeker’s Allowance will continue in its current form but with 
the same earnings rules (such as disregards and tapered withdrawal) as 
Universal Credit, as well as sharing the payment mechanisms and modernised 
administrative systems. This will ensure a seamless service for people who are 
entitled to both contributory Jobseeker’s Allowance and Universal Credit. 
8. Contributory Employment and Support Allowance will also continue, with 
administration and earnings rules aligned with Universal Credit. However, for 
those in the assessment phase and those assessed as being in the Work Related 
Activity Group their contributory Employment and Support Allowance will now be 
time-limited to a maximum of one year. After this time, qualifying recipients may 
be able to receive Universal Credit instead. We also intend to simplify the support 
for people aged under 25 who have been unable to pay the normal amount of 
National Insurance contributions as a result of their disability or health condition.
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Social Fund
9. The Social Fund has been part of the benefits system since 1988. The Fund was 
designed to help people meet exceptional costs that were difficult to budget for 
out of mainstream benefits. However, the Fund has not kept pace with wider 
welfare reform. This has led to complex administration and parts of the scheme 
are poorly targeted and open to abuse. For example, Crisis Loan awards have 
almost tripled since 2006, with little evidence of an underlying increase in need.  
To ensure that the right support is offered to those in genuine need, we intend  
to reform the Social Fund.   
10. Reform will be in two parts. Firstly, those elements that lend themselves to simple 
automated delivery will be incorporated into Universal Credits. Budgeting Loans 
will become an advance-of-benefit facility available in certain circumstances.  
Sure Start Maternity Grants and Cold Weather Payments will be paid automatically 
when the qualifying criteria are met.
11. Secondly, we will reform and devolve those elements of the Fund that require more 
intensive scrutiny and discretion. 
12. It is difficult in a centrally administered system for staff to exercise a high degree 
of discretion. For example, in the case of Crisis Loans, where it is necessary to 
determine if there is a severe risk to the applicant’s health or safety. These services 
can be more effectively run locally where they are linked to other support services.
13. The current system of Community Care Grants and Crisis Loans will therefore be 
reformed. In England, Local Authorities will be responsible for administering much 
of the reformed system – ensuring this support is tailored to local circumstances 
and targeted only at genuine need. Local Authorities will be consulted on the 
design of the new system. If there are new administrative burdens on Local 
Authorities they will be funded by the Department for Work and Pensions in 
the usual way. However, we expect Local Authorities to utilise existing delivery 
mechanism and structures where possible. The Devolved Administrations will 
determine the most appropriate arrangements for Scotland and Wales.
48 Chapter 6 Universal Credit and the wider system 
Passported benefits 
14. With the merger of in- and out-of-work payments, the current criteria for access  
to a range of passported benefits (for example, free school meals and health 
benefits such as exemption from prescription charges) will no longer exist.
15. We will replace the current rules, which base entitlement on receipt of certain 
benefits, to a simpler and fairer system that bases entitlement on an income or 
earnings threshold. We, along with the other relevant government departments, 
will consider the appropriate level for these thresholds, but will aim to ensure that 
the benefits are awarded to broadly the same number of people as currently, 
whilst looking to graduate the thresholds to ensure individuals do not have a 
number of passported benefits reduced at the same time.
16. The Universal Credit will be a Great Britain-wide scheme, with national rules as 
with current out-of-work benefits like Jobseeker’s Allowance. However, some 
elements of support relevant to the Universal Credit – such as passported benefits 
– could be within the remit of the devolved administrations. We will explore these 
issues further over the coming months.
Disability Living Allowance 
17. As noted above, the Government has already announced in the Budget that it  
will fundamentally reform Disability Living Allowance from 2013/14. 
18. We intend to retain its role, outside the Universal Credit, as a non-means-tested 
cash benefit. It will continue to be paid to people in and out of work. 
19. However, spending on Disability Living Allowance has been growing at an 
unsustainable rate, so we do need to ensure that future support is targeted on 
people who face significant barriers to participating in society. At the heart of the 
benefit will be an objective assessment, which we are developing with the help of 
medical experts and disabled people. This will allow us to assess more accurately 
and consistently who would benefit most from additional support. 
20. We plan to consult shortly on our proposals, which will complement the support 
provided to disabled people by Universal Credit.
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Pension saving and Universal Credit
21. In calculating the amount of earnings to be taken into account in Universal  
Credit, 50 per cent of contributions to an occupational or personal pension will  
be disregarded, as now under Income Support.
22. Once the 2012 pension reforms 18 and Universal Credit are fully in place, based 
on a withdrawal rate in Universal Credit of 65 per cent, each £1 that goes into  
the pension pot of an employee who is a basic rate taxpayer and in receipt of 
Universal Credit will only reduce take-home income by 34 pence after minimum 
employer contributions, tax relief and increased Universal Credit payment are 
taken into account. 
23. This makes pensions more affordable for those with the lowest incomes, providing 
a clear incentive for individuals to put money into a pension and benefit from 
forthcoming pension reforms in 2012.
The Devolved Administrations
24. Social Security is a devolved matter in Northern Ireland. The Government will 
continue to work closely with the devolved administration in Northern Ireland  
to seek to maintain a single system across the United Kingdom.
25. Social Security is not a devolved matter elsewhere in the United Kingdom but 
the Government recognises that there are interactions with policy areas that are 
the responsibility of the devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales. It will 
therefore be important to work closely with the devolved administrations to  
deliver the reforms set out in this White Paper.
18 The Pensions Act 2008, introduced measures aimed at encouraging greater private saving which includes work-place 
pension reform due to come into effect in 2012. 
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7The impact of  Universal Credit  . 
Summary 
1) This chapter sets out the nature of the impact we expect Universal Credit to 
have. The Universal Credit design as outlined in this paper will make work pay  
in two important ways: 
 a.  the financial reward for entering work will be improved, particularly for  
those on lowest earnings. We will reduce by 1.3 million the number of 
workless households facing Participation Tax Rates of over 70 per cent 19.
 b.  The financial reward for low earners seeking to increase their earnings  
would be improved through the introduction of a single taper rate of about  
65 per cent. We expect the highest marginal deduction rate, including tax  
and National Insurance contributions, for low-earning workers will be reduced 
from around 96 per cent to around 76 per cent, thereby improving the work 
incentives of around 700,000 people.
2) There will be substantial increases in the take-up of entitlements that are 
currently unclaimed. This, together with the higher entitlements, will lift  
many working age adults and many children out of poverty.
3) The new system will make error and fraud easier to prevent and detect.  
The move to real-time earnings and the removal of end-of-year reconciliation  
will reduce the scope for overpayments.
4) A more work-focused benefit system will have wider benefits for society, in terms 
of better health outcomes, higher educational achievements, and reduced crime.
5) In the long-run we anticipate that there will be savings from the dynamic  
labour supply effects, with Universal Credit reducing the number of workless 
households by as much as 300,000, and an annual flow of savings due to the 
greater administrative simplicity of the new system. Before taking account  
of these savings, we expect total support provided through the working-age 
benefit system to increase substantially through the introduction of Universal 
Credit, in particular for those in work.  
19 Estimated on the basis of work of 10 hours per week, at the National Minimum Wage.
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Universal Credit model and the baseline
1.  The publication has set out the Government’s intended design for Universal Credit. 
In the coming months, we will finalise policy on those aspects we have said we are 
still considering and assess the interaction it has with other recently announced 
reforms. However, we are now in a position to set out the impact we expect 
Universal Credit to have.
2.  This analysis is based on the design set out in the rest of the publication. It includes 
the costs, distributional impacts and changes to work incentives. Our analysis 
compares the effect of this new system with the current benefits and Tax Credits 
system, incorporating the changes set out in the June 2010 Budget.     
3.  We present our estimates on the basis of the pre-Spending Review position 
because Universal Credit was the centrepiece of the welfare reforms the 
Government announced in that Review. Some of the other Spending Review 
measures will affect the detail of the impact shown here. Future decisions on  
some elements of the design the Government is still considering, as covered 
in earlier chapters, may also affect the precise results. We will provide further 
analysis in the impact assessment we publish with the Welfare Reform Bill.
Overall financial impacts
4.  The introduction of Universal Credit will enable the Government to increase and 
better target the support that is provided through the benefit system in order to 
ensure that work always pays and the most vulnerable are protected. 
5.  The increased support comes from greater generosity for in-work households with 
low earnings and more consistent support as households increase their earnings.  
In addition, the simplification of the system will lead to significantly improved 
take-up of benefit entitlements among this group. Alongside this, there will be 
substantial savings due to reduced fraud and error.
6.  The costs 20 of Universal Credit will build up over a number of years. The Spending 
Review set aside £2 billion to fund the implementation of Universal Credit over the 
Spending Review period. 
7.  The greater simplicity of the Universal Credit system will lead to a streamlined 
administration, which we anticipate will lead to savings of more than £0.5 billion  
a year.
20 Costs and savings are quoted in 2010/11 prices.
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Take-up and poverty
8.  By creating a single, integrated benefit, households who claim Universal Credit will 
now automatically receive everything they are entitled to. The new system ensures 
that someone either claims everything (because they are eligible) or nothing (because 
they are ineligible). In effect, there will be ‘automatic passporting’ for people who 
currently claim some, but not all, of the benefits or Tax Credits to which they are 
currently entitled. Hence with this much simpler system, households will be more 
likely to claim their full entitlement. 
9.  By virtue of the changes to entitlement and improved take up, Universal Credit  
will have a substantial positive impact on poverty, for both children and adults: 
Universal Credit could lift as many as 350,000 children and 500,000 working-age 
adults out of poverty. This is before we consider the positive impact of more people 
moving into work. 
The distributional impact of Universal Credit
10.  This radical restructuring of the benefits and Tax Credits system is strongly 
progressive. It enables the Government to focus support more heavily and  
more consistently on those at the lower end of the income distribution. 
11.  Many households will receive more under Universal Credit than under the current 
system. These higher entitlements arise primarily for three broad groups of working 
households with low earnings: 
•   households not entitled to Working Tax Credit under the current system,  
for example, because they are working less than 16 hours a week or are  
childless and aged under 25, who gain entitlement to in-work support under 
Universal Credit;
•   households receiving Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit under the current 
system who benefit from a significant reduction in the rate at which their benefit  
is withdrawn as earnings increase; and
•   other households who benefit from the higher earnings disregards and, for most 
people, lower withdrawal rate the Government is building into Universal Credit.
12.  Figure 11 (opposite) shows the average net financial impact we would expect 
Universal Credit to have by income 21 decile. In the bottom decile, the average 
impact of Universal Credit will be to increase net incomes by around 1.5 per cent –  
a cash value of £2.40 per week. In decile two this figure is around 1 per cent, which 
equates to more than £3.60 per week. This is before we take the impact of increased 
take-up into account, so is likely to significantly understate the gains to those on the 
lowest incomes.
21 Equivalised for household size.
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Source: Department for Work and Pensions Policy Simulation Model  
(based on Family Resources Survey 2008/9), 2014/15. 22
13.  No-one will experience a reduction in the benefit they are receiving as a result of 
the introduction of Universal Credit. At the point of transition onto the new system, 
those households whose circumstances remain unchanged and who would otherwise 
experience a reduction in income will receive cash protection. 
14.  Universal Credit will remove the complexities and inconsistent support available in  
the current benefits and Tax Credits system and replace it with increased support  
for low-income families and consistency in support as income rises. This simplification 
means that, in the long term, some households will be entitled to less under Universal 
Credit than they would have been had the current benefits and Tax Credits system 
continued. These distributional losses will also arise gradually over time, as new people 
come into the system and the circumstances of existing cases change. Figure 11 shows 
this long-term impact. We expect to see average net incomes reduce in the long term 
in only deciles 7 to 10, and even there the average reduction will be small – less than 
15 pence per week in deciles 8 to 10. 23
22 Modelling captures the effects of changes to entitlement, but does not include the impact of take-up, fraud and error 
effects, nor the removal of the earnings disregard currently applied to changes of circumstances in Tax Credits.
23 The small average losses in deciles 7-10 come from the removal of the 30 hour premium of Working Tax Credit for higher 
earners. The losses arise in the long term only and are higher in decile 7 because a greater proportion of people in that 
decile would have been in receipt of Working Tax Credit.
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Earnings Incentives 
15.  We expect the impacts on earnings incentives to be large. Universal Credit will 
improve earnings incentives for 700,000 current low earning workers. It increases 
their financial reward to work more hours or increase their wage rate, and as such  
it creates a more flexible workforce.
16.  The expected Universal Credit withdrawal rate of 65 per cent means that to all intents 
and purposes, the highest Marginal Deduction Rate 24 for low-earning workers would 
be reduced from around 96 per cent to 65 per cent for those earning below the 
personal tax threshold and to around 76 per cent for basic rate taxpayers.
17.  The following table 1 shows how the earnings incentives of people earning below  
the personal tax threshold are improved under Universal Credit compared with  
the current system. 
Table 1: Marginal Deduction Rates 25 for those in work (working age only), 
earning below the tax threshold 
Marginal Deduction Rate 
for non-taxpaying earners 
Current system 
millions 
Universal Credit 
millions 
Difference 
millions 
Up to 60%  0.3 0.1 -0.3
60%-70%  0.0 0.5  0.5
70%-80%  0.0 0.0  0.0
80%-90%  0.1 0.0 -0.1
Over 90%  0.1 0.0 -0.1
Source: Department for Work and Pensions Policy Simulation Model (based on Family Resources 
Survey 2008/9), 2014/15 – Figures may not sum due to rounding. 26 
18.  For taxpaying benefit recipients, Marginal Deduction Rates would typically be  
76 per cent as a result of an expected withdrawal rate from post-tax earnings  
of 65 per cent. 
24 The Marginal Deduction Rate is the proportion of any extra earnings that is lost as a result of paying more tax and 
National Insurance and losing benefits. It is a useful measure of the incentive to increase earnings (for example,  
by working more hours). A higher Marginal Deduction Rate implies there is less incentive to increase earnings.
25 Marginal Deduction Rates for those receiving income-related benefits or Tax Credits in the current system or receiving 
Universal Credit. Self employed and students are excluded.
26 Modelling is based on entitlement changes only.
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Table 2: Marginal Deduction Rates 27 for those in work (working age only), 
earning above the tax threshold 
Marginal Deduction Rate 
for taxpaying benefit recipients 
Current system 
millions 
Universal Credit 
millions 
Difference 
millions 
Up to 60%  0.9 0.8  0.0
60%-70%  0.2 0.4  0.2
70%-80%  1.7 2.0  0.3
80%-90%  0.4 0.0 -0.4
Over 90%  0.1 * -0.1
Source: Department for Work and Pensions Policy Simulation Model (based on Family Resources 
Survey 2008/9), 2014/15 – Figures may not sum due to rounding. 28 
* denotes fewer than 50,000 people
19.  Establishing a single withdrawal rate, and eliminating the hours rules currently 
present in Working Tax Credit, has the potential to create a much more flexible 
labour market. Workers will be able to work the number of hours that most suits their 
needs and those of their employer, without being constrained by the structure of the 
benefits system. Employers will find that their workforces become more flexible and 
open to opportunities for progression.
20.  For example, it will now be financially rewarding for a lone parent to work 15 hours 
per week, or 17 hours per week (both of which would not have been financially 
rewarded under the existing system which only recognised 16 hours per week);  
and should more hours be available, the extra earnings will no longer face a Marginal 
Deduction Rate of 96 per cent. Under the current system a lone parent working  
16 hours at the National Minimum Wage would only increase their take home pay  
by £5 a week if they increased their hours to 25 hours. Under Universal Credit the 
same lone parent would increase their take home pay by £17. 
21.  Under the current system parents whose spouses work full time do not face the same 
financial incentives and constraints as lone parents – and as a result they are able to, 
and do, work a wide range of different hours – to suit their situation. We believe the 
same opportunities should be available for all.
22.  Hence, Universal Credit will match more closely the structure of today’s labour market, 29 
where part-time jobs and flexible working are much more common than they once 
were. Furthermore, this reform will increase the range of viable jobs in the economy.
27 Marginal Deduction Rates for those receiving income-related benefits or Tax Credits in the current system or receiving 
Universal Credit. Self employed and students are excluded.
28 Modelling is based on entitlement changes only.
29 In the three months June to August 2010, the increase in employment was 178 thousand. Of this increase 143,000 
(80 per cent) were in part-time jobs. Office for National Statistics, Labour Markets Statistics, October 2010.
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Employment incentives 
23.  Universal Credit will increase the financial rewards to enter, and retain work for low 
earners. It will reduce the highest Participation Tax Rates 30 they currently face, and will 
create a genuinely progressive set of Participation Tax Rates.
24.  The number of households facing Participation Tax Rates over 70 per cent in this 
situation would reduce by around 1.3 million under Universal Credit – increasing 
dramatically the financial reward from entering work, especially at low earnings.  
Table 3 shows the Participation Tax Rates for workless households if they were  
all to enter work at 10 hours per week at National Minimum Wage. 
Table 3: Participation Tax Rates for the first earner in a workless household if they were to enter 
work at 10 hours per week (working age only) 
Participation Tax Rate 
for first earners 
Current system 
millions 
Universal Credit 
millions 
Difference 
millions 
Up to 60%  1.2 3.0  1.8
60%-70%  1.5 1.0 -0.5
70%-80%  0.2 0.2 -0.1
80%-90%  0.6 * -0.6
Over 90%  0.6 * -0.6
Source: Department for Work and Pensions Policy Simulation Model (based on Family Resources Survey 
2008/9), 2014/15 31 – Figures may not sum due to rounding. 
* denotes fewer than 50,000 people
25.  The introduction of more generous earnings disregards in Universal Credit, when 
combined with a single taper rate, creates a genuinely progressive Participation Tax 
Rate. This means that the combined withdrawal of benefits and taxes from the lowest 
earners (who tend to have the least secure employment prospects) is always less than 
from higher earners.  
26.  The improvement in Participation Tax Rates is illustrated in Figure 12 which shows the 
Participation Tax Rate for a lone parent with two children. In this example, the higher 
disregards for lone parents in Universal Credit mean that benefit is not withdrawn 
until around seven hours of work at the National Minimum Wage, whereas the current 
system withdraws benefit earlier. 
30 The Participation Tax Rate measures the proportion of total earnings lost from withdrawal of benefits and taxation. 
It is a measure of the financial reward for entering work. A high Participation Tax Rate means the financial incentive  
to work is low, and a low Participation Tax Rate means that the incentive is higher.
31 Modelling is based on entitlement changes only.
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27.  Such a lone parent in these circumstances would gain more from a move into  
work under Universal Credit than under the current system. This is true for most 
hours levels, and especially so for low-hours work. The viable options for entering 
work have expanded well beyond the current 16-hour option.
28.  Hence, under Universal Credit not only is the current labour force more flexible, 
but there are many more financially rewarding job opportunities for workless 
households.
Impact of simplification
29.  Universal Credit will radically simplify the current system of benefits and Tax Credits. 
This will improve work incentives in three ways: increased transparency of the 
financial benefits of work, reduced administrative burden on entering work, and 
reduced risk associated with an initially unsuccessful attempt at entering work.
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30.  Under the current system, there is clear evidence that many people are unaware 
of their full benefit entitlements and potential gains from moving into work. Latest 
statistics show that the take-up rate of Housing Benefit for people in work is low – 
between just 38 per cent and 51 per cent. There is also evidence that this means 
that many are deterred from entering work. 32 The simplification of the system 
under Universal Credit will reinforce the transformation of the financial incentives 
to participate in work by helping people to see clearly that work pays. 
31.  Currently, somebody moving from an out-of-work benefit to work of 16 hours or 
more will typically cease a claim for benefit and start a new claim for Tax Credits 
with HM Revenue & Customs, as well as informing their Local Authority of a change 
in circumstances. This can be a daunting process, and people may face some delay 
in receiving their full entitlement – in some cases, delays in handling the change to 
Housing Benefit can leave tenants with arrears of rent. Universal Credit will smooth 
the current transition between benefits and work, and in the process remove much 
of the burden from taking that step. 
32.  Many people perceive the process of moving between benefits and work as a risky 
one. They may perceive a substantial risk of a delay in receiving new entitlements, 
possibly as a result of their own previous experience or the experience of friends 
and family. Similarly they may fear that should they later lose their job, it would 
take some time to re-establish their entitlement to out-of-work benefits. 
33.  Universal Credit is a single system supporting those in and out of work. Hence, as 
people’s earnings increase or decrease, their Universal Credit amount will adjust 
smoothly to reflect this – thereby eliminating this risk.
Dynamic effects
34.  This scale and scope of the Government’s Universal Credit reform is unprecedented 
in recent times – it is the most significant change to the welfare system since the 
Beveridge reforms in 1947. However, even those pivotal reforms were ultimately the 
source of a good deal of today’s complexity and the simplification that Universal 
Credit will bring is without parallel in UK history.
35.  This chapter has set out the scale of the static impacts the Government expects 
Universal Credit to have. However, we believe that these impacts will be even more 
positive in practice because of the dynamic effects.
36.  The introduction of Universal Credit will drive dynamic labour market effects as a 
result of many factors:
a.  increased financial rewards to work;
b.  increased transparency of these rewards;
c.   reduced administrative complexity associated with a move into work and, 
related to this, reduced risks of interruptions in benefit payments occurring; 
32 Turley C and Thomas A, September 2006, Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit as in-work benefits: Claimants’ 
and advisors’ knowledge, attitudes and experiences, Department for Work and Pensions Report 383.
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d. reinforcement of the conditionality regime; and
e.  in the long-run, the reinforcement of pro-work social norms.
37.  Given the fundamental nature of these reforms, no model or analytical technique 
exists that could enable us to quantify these effects with absolute precision. 
However, the scale of the Universal Credit measures is such that we can be very 
confident that they will have a significantly greater impact than any previous 
reforms, examples of which are provided in table 4, below.
Table 4: Employment gains from recent labour market reforms
Recent labour market reforms Employment impact
Tax Credits, New Deal for Lone Parents and childcare strategy   80,000 Lone parents 33
New Deal for Young People   30,000 34
Working Families Tax Credits   25,000-59,000 35
38.  Based on available evidence, a plausible estimate is that the Universal Credit 
reform will reduce the number of workless households by around 300,000. 36
We believe that there is no reason why this increase should not be brought  
about within two to three years of implementation. 
39.  The majority of the reduction in workless households will be brought about by an 
increase in the number of currently workless people who will choose to engage in 
part-time work. The design of Universal Credit is specifically targeted to achieve 
this and the improvement in the incentives for currently workless people to move 
into part-time work is substantial. The improved financial incentives to move into 
work will be reinforced by the Work Programme and the completion of the transfer 
of Incapacity Benefit recipients to the Employment and Support Allowance.
40.  We also believe that Universal Credit will create new opportunities for people to 
combine part-time work with benefit receipt and that this will significantly reduce 
the incentives for people to behave fraudulently and to “work and claim”. 
41.  In addition to the increase in part-time working among currently workless people, 
we also expect that more people will be prepared to move into more substantial 
jobs as a result of the greater clarity of work incentives, the simpler administrative 
procedures, and the reduced risk of experiencing an interruption in benefit 
payments when moving into work.
33 Gregg P and Harkness S, June 2003, Welfare reform and lone parents employment in the UK. CMPO working paper. 
series no. 03/072.
34 Riley and Young, December 2000, New Deal for Young People: Implications for Employment and the Public Finances, 
Employment Service Research Report 062.
35 Blundell R, Brewer M and Shephard A, 2005, Evaluating the labour market impact of Working Families Tax Credit using 
difference-in-differences HM Revenue & Customs Working Paper 4.
36 Based on internal analysis using the Department for Work and Pensions’ Policy Simulation Model. It combines a set  
of plausible assumptions about the impact of improved incentives to work in a Universal Credit world with evidence of 
the impact of previous initiatives to improve incentives to work. Further evidence is set out in the Impact Assessment 
that accompanies this White Paper.
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42.  Looking further ahead, the reduction in workless households should act to reduce 
worklessness further as a culture of work becomes the norm amongst a greater 
number of households and communities. 
43.  Although the number of workless households will reduce, it is possible that, in 
some families, second earners may choose to reduce or rebalance their hours or  
to leave work. In these cases, the improved ability of the main earner to support 
his or her family will increase the options available for families to strike their 
preferred work/life balance. 
Fraud and error 
44.  The greater simplicity of the Universal Credit scheme will generate savings  
by reducing the scope for fraud, error and overpayments. For example, one 
category of fraud and error in the Tax Credit system is the incorrect reporting  
of hours worked. Because hours worked play little or no role in the Universal  
Credit assessment this should largely disappear under the new system.
45.  Taken together with the impact of the planned use of real-time earnings on 
overpayments of Tax Credits, we anticipate that these measures will reduce  
losses from fraud, error and overpayments by more than £1 billion per year in  
the long term. 
46.  In the longer term we also expect the greater simplicity of the Universal Credit 
system to reduce administrative costs by more than £0.5 billion a year.
Equality impacts
47.  Some of the design and operational issues have the potential to affect the 
protected groups under the public sector equality duty. We will be carrying out a 
full Equality Impact Assessment which we will publish in January 2011 as part of  
a broader set of Impact Assessments for the Welfare Reform Bill. In the meantime 
we are publishing, an outline of the Equality Impact Assessment explaining the 
evidence which is available on potential equality impacts, and how we will monitor 
and evaluate these equality impacts in the Welfare Reform Bill.
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Annex 1  
Consultation response  
21st Century Welfare: summary of consultation responses 
The consultation document, 21st Century Welfare (Cm 7913), asked people to send their 
views on the problems with the current benefits system, on the Government’s principles  
for welfare reform and on its proposals to simplify the system and make work pay.
The consultation period ran from 30 July to 1 October and received 1,668 responses  
via telephone, post, email and through our online consultation site. 
Table 5 Breakdown of consultation responses 
Origin of response Number of responses
Members of the public 776
Department for Work and Pensions Staff 567
External Organisations 325
Total 1,668
A formal report of the responses is being published alongside this publication, Consultation 
responses to 21st Century Welfare (Cm 7971). This report details the main points raised 
by respondents and summarises the responses to the 12 specific questions posed in the 
consultation document. It also includes the Government’s responses to the points raised.
Both the original consultation document and the report are available at  
www.dwp.gov.uk/consultations/2010/21st-century-welfare 
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Paper copies can be obtained from:
Department for Work and Pensions  
Benefit Reform Division  
1st Floor  
Caxton House  
Tothill Street  
London SW1H 9NA. 
Leading themes from the responses 
Respondents agreed that fundamental reform of the benefit system is needed  
and supported the basic tenets of our proposals:
•  Of the five options for reform suggested in 21st Century Welfare there was 
widespread agreement with the principles underpinning the Universal  
Credit proposal.
•  There was overwhelming support for simplifying and streamlining both the benefit 
structure and the delivery process. 
•  There was a strong belief that people should be clearly better off in work than  
on benefits.
•  Respondents wanted more details on our proposals before they could fully  
endorse them.
Other leading themes to emerge included: 
•  There were concerns about what the reforms might mean for people in vulnerable 
circumstances and those unable to work. Many stressed the importance of putting 
appropriate safeguards in place for these people.
•  Most respondents agreed it was reasonable to apply conditions to the receipt of 
benefit. Some felt that for those able to work, the existing requirements to be 
available for and actively seeking work could be extended to include working  
within the local community.
•  If conditionality is to be increased, protections must be put in place to ensure  
that people in vulnerable circumstances are not penalised.
•  Concern whether there would be insufficient sustainable jobs available to support  
our reforms.
•  The complexity of the system is not the only problem preventing people looking  
for work, equally important are issues such as personal health, child care, and  
skills shortages. 
•  Work is not necessarily the most appropriate immediate option for everybody.  
For some, education, training, or voluntary work might be a more beneficial first 
step, before starting work.
•  Concerns about the implications of housing costs being met from a single award. 
It was feared that paying the housing element directly to the Universal Credit 
recipient could have a negative impact on landlords’ rent collection whilst causing 
individuals to fall into debt. 
•  Local Authorities who responded were keen to remain involved in benefit 
administration to make use of existing infrastructure and trained staff with  
a knowledge of local issues. 
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Annex 2. 
Options for reform. 
1. In 21st Century Welfare (Cm 7913), the Government outlined seven principles to 
guide reform (page 18). These are: 
a.  ensure that people can see that the clear rewards from taking all types of work 
outweigh the risks;
b.  further incentivise and encourage households and families to move into work 
and to increase the amount of work they do, by improving the rewards from work 
at low earnings, helping them keep more of their earnings as they work harder;
c.  increase fairness between different groups of benefit recipients and between 
recipients and taxpayers; 
d.  continue to support those most in need and ensure that interactions with other 
systems of support for basic needs are considered;
e.  promote responsibility and positive behaviour, doing more to reward saving, 
strengthening the family and, in tandem with improving incentives, reinforcing 
conditionality;
f.  automate processes and maximise self-service, to reduce the scope for fraud, 
error and overpayments. This could include a responsive and immediate service 
that saves the taxpayer significant amounts of money and ensures compliance 
costs for employers, at worst, are no worse than under the current system; and 
g.  ensure that the benefits and Tax Credits system is affordable in the short and 
longer term. 
2. The paper went on to consider five broad options: 
Universal Credit
3. This approach merges out-of-work benefits with in-work Tax Credits in a single 
credit system, increasing the amount recipients can earn before their benefits are 
affected and withdrawing support at a single transparent rate thereafter. It would 
maintain income-related benefits at a similar level to the current system.
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A Single Unified Taper
4. The Single Unified Taper model retains the current systems and agencies but unifies 
the rate at which support is reduced when people go into work.
Single Working Age Benefit
5. The Single Working Age Benefit would replace existing out-of-work benefits, including 
Income Support, Incapacity Benefits, Jobseeker’s Allowance, Employment and Support 
Allowance and Carer’s Allowance, giving all working-age recipients a single, flat rate, 
fully means-tested income replacement benefit with no contributory entitlement  
and no premiums, regardless of whether they were jobseekers, lone parents, sick  
or disabled. All existing premiums for additional costs would be transferred to other 
redistributive vehicles such as Tax Credits or Disability Living Allowance.
Mirrlees model
6. This approach uses optimal tax theory to design an efficient system of household 
tax and transfer programmes. The new system would replace Jobseeker’s Allowance, 
Income Support, Housing Benefit and Tax Credits with a single ‘Family Allowance’ 
which would then be tapered through the tax system. 
Single benefit/negative income tax model 
7. This would replace current income replacement benefits and Tax Credits and 
incorporate them within the tax system (reducing the level of the tax until all  
support was exhausted). 
Comparing the options
8. Responses to 21st Century Welfare (Cm 7913) showed a consensus for an integrated 
benefit that would be simpler and render the current interactions between benefits 
more transparent. 
9. By far the greatest number of those respondents who expressed a preference for 
one of these models supported the Universal Credit (though with concerns about the 
level of detail that appeared in the consultation document). Nevertheless, many of 
those responding believed that the Universal Credit model appeared to be the fairest 
and simplest to understand. People felt that it could create a simpler and far less 
opaque system that would increase awareness of their in and out-of-work incomes 
and considerably ease the transition between being wholly supported by benefit and 
entering and moving forward within the labour market. People also welcomed the 
more generous disregards and single taper within Universal Credit and felt this model 
was the most likely to deliver an increase in benefit take-up. 
10. The Government is convinced that the Universal Credit, which draws on the best 
features of the other options, is the way forward. Specific problems with the other 
options include:
•  The Single Unified Taper, while improving the treatment of income and avoiding 
the high Marginal Deduction Rates which bedevil the current system, retains the 
split between in and out-of-work benefits. This would mean that much of the 
complexity of the current system would remain. Claiming and leaving out-of-
work benefits would still involve a daunting paper chase. Further, by doing away 
with the earnings disregard, this proposal would worsen the incentives for some 
to try out work.
•  The Single Working Age Benefit, also retains the split between in and out-of-
work benefits. By providing a single flat rate of benefit for all groups, this option 
would fail to recognise the additional needs of disabled people and carers.  
By doing away with contributory benefits, this option would also undermine  
the principle that benefits should be paid in return for contributions paid while  
in work.
•  The structure of the Mirrlees model is very similar to the Universal Credit, 
it combines out-of-work benefits with Tax Credits and housing support in a  
single family-based assessment. However, this option would provide lower  
rates of support for families with no earnings (for example, the proposed 
Personal Allowance for a couple would be £80 per week). However, by providing 
more generous disregards and tapers, this option is estimated to cost £9 billion 
a year – substantially more than the Universal Credit.
•  The Taxpayer’s Alliance proposal for a negative income tax also shares much of 
the structural detail with the Universal Credit. This option would combine most 
in and out-of-work benefits in a single payment. However, some of the detail 
would represent a more radical departure from existing provision, in particular, 
basing the amounts available to families who are out of work on a proportion of 
median income. The effect is difficult to predict but it would either substantially 
increase the cost of the system or result in substantial numbers of people in 
vulnerable situations losing entitlement. 
Conclusion
11. The Government believes that the Universal Credit is the most appropriate model 
to pursue as it offers the most scope to improve work incentives and rewards even 
small amounts of work. It is also likely to be the most effective in smoothing the 
transition to work, especially compared with models that retain distinct out-of-
work benefits and Tax Credits. A further advantage of this smoother transition  
is the greater opportunity to automate processes and self-service. Universal  
Credit is also the model which received the most support from the individuals  
and organisations responding to the consultation. 
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Annex 3. 
Treatment of earnings and 
income in Universal Credit . 
Earnings disregards 
1. In Universal Credit, as explained in chapter 2, different amounts will be disregarded 
from earnings before the taper applies in order to reflect the needs of different 
families and ensure that work pays. The amount to be disregarded will be reduced 
to reflect support people receive for rent or mortgage interest support. 37 
2. The actual disregard levels will be set closer to the date of implementation.  
We currently envisage maximum disregards (annual figures) of around:
•  couple: £3,000 plus £2,700 per household for a child (regardless of 
number of children); 
• lone parent: £5,000 plus £2,700 per household for a child; and 
•  disabled people: £7,000 per household if a recipient or either 
partner in a couple is disabled. 
3. The reduction for housing costs goes as far as a ‘disregard floor’. The annual 
amounts we have modelled are:
•  couple: £520 per household plus £520 for the first child, £260 for each of the 
second and third children;
•  lone parent: £1,560 per household plus £520 for the first child, £260 for each 
of the second and third children; and
• disabled people: £2,080.
4. We do not expect to include a disregard for a single person without children –  
any earnings would be tapered off straight away. 
37 We envisage that disregards will be reduced by one-and-a-half times the recipient’s eligible rent or mortgage 
interest support.
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Box 1 Example 
A lone parent with three children has rent of £80 a week. 
The assumed maximum disregard in her case is £7,700 and the disregard floor  
is £2.600 (annual figures). Reducing the disregard by 1.5 times the help with  
housing costs (£6,240 annual figure) would bring the disregard below the floor.
So the disregard that applies is the floor of £2,600 = £50 a week. As a result of  
the 65 per cent taper she also keeps 35p for each £1 of net earnings over £50.
Under the current system on Income Support the earnings disregard for a lone  
parent is £20 a week. Any earnings over that are deducted pound for pound. 
Income from self-employment
5. Some self-employed people under Tax Credits report very low levels of income.  
We know that in starting up a business that it can take some time before it becomes 
profitable. But once established we would expect to see a reasonable income from 
the business activity. So for Universal Credit we are considering introducing a floor of 
assumed income from self-employment for those registering as such. The floor will be 
set at the National Minimum wage for the reported hours; clearly profits above this 
limit may be received and reported. For those self-employed people who engage in 
only a few hours of activity, and do no other form of paid employment then we will 
expect them to engage with the conditionality requirements as set out in Chapter 4. 
Other income and capital rules
6. A new feature of the Universal Credit is that it will detach the assessment of earnings 
from the assessment of other income, using an automated system that feeds the 
calculation of Universal Credit with information on the payment of earnings through 
the BACS payment system. 
7. Other income will be taken into account in calculating the entitlement before earnings 
are deducted. Some income will disregarded – for example, Disability Living Allowance 
will be fully disregarded. Other income, for example an occupational pension, will be 
taken into account in full. 
8. Universal Credit will have the same capital rules as currently apply to Income Support. 
There will be an upper capital limit above which there is no entitlement and a lower 
limit below which capital is fully disregarded. An income will be assumed for capital 
between the lower and upper limits. 
Family Assessment
9. Universal Credit will be assessed on a ‘household’ basis taking account of the 
income and capital of a single adult or two adults who live as a couple (whether 
married or in a civil partnership or living together as if married or in a civil 
partnership). Any income or capital of a dependent child will be disregarded. 
10. We assume that ordinarily with a joint claim, only one of the partners would 
receive the Universal Credit payment. However we will consider the scope to 
arrange payments to parents in couples, so that support for children goes to  
the mother or main carer, as now in Tax Credits.
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